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Introduction 
In 2008, the Commonwealth Government took a great leap forward in embracing the 
glittering promise of the Mabo decision1 and the potential of native title for Australia. 
Prime Minister Rudd’s eloquent and empathetic apology speech honoured Australia’s 
Indigenous peoples as the world’s oldest living culture and apologised for past laws and 
policies that had caused suffering.2 The Prime Minister urged the forging of a new future 
between Indigenous and non Indigenous Australians with an ‘absolute premium on 
respect, cooperation and mutual responsibility’, where we begin the hard work of finding 
‘new solutions to enduring problems where old approaches have failed.’3
 
The Commonwealth Attorney General Robert McClelland4 and Indigenous Affairs 
Minister Jenny Macklin5 announced that as part of this new future, native title was no 
longer to be isolated from mainstream Indigenous affairs, languishing as an end in itself 
after years of tortuous litigation. Instead, native title was recognised as ‘critical to 
economic development’6 and that a ‘native title system which delivers real outcomes in a 
timely and efficient way … is a key priority of the Rudd Labor government’.7 Native title 
has a ‘crucial role to play’8 in implementing the commitments made by the Prime 
Minister by providing the foundation for ‘comprehensive settlements’9 of land related 
issues. Such comprehensive settlements would be a truly ‘whole of government initiative, 
encompassing housing, economic development, health, law and order and leadership and 
governance.’10  
 
By acknowledging this role for native title, the Commonwealth positions itself as 
embracing the real opportunities of the Mabo decision, which Minister Macklin (quoting 
Noel Pearson) names as the ‘best opportunity for the resolution of colonial grievances 
between Indigenous and non Indigenous Australians … the cornerstone for reconciliation 
                                                 
 1 Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
2 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd MP, ‘Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples’, House of Representatives, 
Debates, 13 February 2005, viewed 29 April 2009,  
<http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/dr130208.pdf > 
3 Rudd, above n 2. 
4 Hon Robert McClelland MP (Attorney General), paper presented at the Negotiating Native Title Forum, 
Brisbane, 29 February 2008. The Attorney General reiterated these views in his keynote address to the 
2009 AIATSIS Native Title Conference: Hon Robert McClelland MP (Attorney General), Keynote 
Address, Melbourne, 5 June 2009, viewed 30 July 2009, 
<http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/conf2009/NativeTitleConferenceWebsite/papers.html>. 
5 Hon. Jenny Macklin MP (Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), 
‘Beyond Mabo: Native Title and Closing the Gap’, 2008 Mabo Lecture, Townsville, 21 May 2008. 
Minister Macklin reiterated these views at the AIATSIS 2009 Native Title Conference in her address to 
conference delegates: Hon Jenny Macklin MP (Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs), Native Title Conference 2009, Melbourne, 5 June 2009, viewed 30 July 2009,  
<http://ntru.aiatsis.gov.au/conf2009/NativeTitleConferenceWebsite/papers.html>.   
6 Macklin, above n 5. 
7 McClelland, above n 4,  para.10. 
8 McClelland,  above n 4, para.5. 
9 Macklin,  above n 5. 
10 Macklin,  above n 5. 
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– legally, politically, historically and morally’ and not ‘simply a legal doctrine relating to 
real estate’.11
 
In terms of how to harness this potential, Minister Macklin states that we need: 
 
an approach that stringently examines the facts and makes policy decisions 
based on ‘what works’. To succeed it is essential to develop an evidence 
base which can deliver solutions across locations and across cultural 
differences.12  
 
Public dialogue on an evidence based approach to comprehensive native title settlements 
has yet to occur.13 I use the term ‘comprehensive settlements’ to refer to agreements 
necessarily with governments (but could include private interests) which, due to the 
nature of government responsibilities, have the potential to address governance, 
economic, social, cultural and/or legal concerns of native title groups.14 This paper seeks 
to contribute to such an evidence based dialogue by analysing aspects of three Australian 
agreements which were the earliest attempts of what could be considered comprehensive 
settlements: 
 
• the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi Burrup Agreement (‘the Burrup Agreement’);15 
• the Miriuwung and Gajerrong Ord Global Agreement (‘the MG-Ord 
Agreement’);16 and   
• the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk Peoples Agreement 
(‘the Wimmera Agreement’).17 
 
                                                 
11 Macklin,  above n 5. Original quote from Noel Pearson, ‘Peoples, Nations and Peace’, Mabo Oration, 
Brisbane, 3 July 2005.  
12 Macklin, above n 5. 
13 The Government has taken steps in develop this evidence base in relation to benefits from resource 
agreements. In 2008, Minister Macklin convened a Native Title Payments Working Group comprised of 
experts from interest groups, which provided a report to the Minister resulting in a Government discussion 
paper on improving benefits from native title agreements. At the time of writing, the Government’s 
consideration is ongoing.  See Attorney-General’s Department, Optimising benefits from native title 
discussions paper,  Attorney-General’s Department, viewed 29 April 2009, 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Indigenouslawandnativetitle_Nativetitle_DiscussionPaper-
OptimisingbenefitsfromNativeTitleAgreements>. 
14 For a discussion of different meanings of the concept of ‘comprehensive agreements’ see Stuart 
Bradfield, ‘Agreeing to Terms: What is a ‘Comprehensive’ Agreement?’, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of 
Native Title, vol. 2, no.26, 2004.  
15 Office of Native Title (Western Australia), Burrup and Maitland Industrial Estates Agreement, 
Department of Premier and Cabinet, Perth, viewed 29 April 2009, 
<http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/agreements_BurrupMaitland.aspx>. 
16 Office of Native Title (Western Australia), Ord Final Agreement, Department of Premier and Cabinet, 
Perth viewed 29 April 2009,  http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/agreements_OrdFinalAgreement.aspx. 
17 Clarke on behalf of the Wimmera, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagulk Peoples v State of 
Victoria [2005] FCA 1795 (No. 1-3) and Extract from Register of Indigenous Land Use Agreements, 
National Native Title Tribunal, NNTT No. VI2004/008. < http://www.nntt.gov.au/Indigenous-Land-Use-
Agreements/Search-Registered-ILUAs/Pages/Search.aspx>.  
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Notably, the MG-Ord and Wimmera agreements were approvingly cited by the Attorney 
General in his 2008 speech as examples of the Commonwealth’s new vision for native 
title.18
 
My analysis of the three agreements is primarily based on observations made at a two day 
workshop by representatives of the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi, the Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong, the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk peoples and their 
negotiating teams; the WA government and their negotiating teams; and invited 
participants from the native title field. The aim of the workshop was to gain firsthand 
accounts of the role of comprehensive settlements in progressing Indigenous and 
government aspirations for native title and to identify possible benchmarks for such 
settlements. Firstly, by way of contextualising these observations, I outline the potential 
of comprehensive native title settlements advocated by many Indigenous leaders and 
academics since the Mabo decision. 
Native Title is ‘Not Simply a Legal Doctrine Relating to Real Estate’ 
The Rudd Government’s recognition of native title as ‘uniquely placed to acknowledge 
traditional laws and customs, and the relationship between Indigenous people and the 
country they have lived on for thousands of years; and to provide opportunities to the 
present day native title holders and their communities’19 reflects aspirations Indigenous 
leaders have always held for the Mabo decision, but with one important difference. In 
addition to native title’s symbolic recognition of prior ownership and its economic 
potential, Indigenous leaders have persistently highlighted the political footprint of native 
title. 
 
This political footprint arises from the fact that recognition of native title is only by virtue 
of Indigenous Australians’ specific existence as ‘distinct peoples and as a constitutional 
entity’.20 As Lisa Strelein explains, this political status means that native title holders are 
not merely ‘a cultural minority within an otherwise homogenous Australian polity’.21 
Native title is an acknowledgement of the continuation of Indigenous society as a source 
of political authority. Native title jurisprudence recognises (and indeed requires) that 
traditional laws and customs generated from societies seeking native title recognition are 
a legitimate source of native title rights and obligations in relation to each society’s 
cultural, religious and political economy. As Peter Yu aptly observed, since Mabo: 
 
the issue of governance for a sovereign group whose members are bound 
together by a system of laws and customs as opposed to an incorporated 
                                                 
18 McClelland, above n 4, paras. 50-55. 
19 McClelland, above n 4,  para.65. 
20 Dr Lisa Strelein, ‘Symbolism and Function: From Native Title to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Self-Government’ in Marcia Langton, Maureen Tehan, Lisa Palmer & Kathryn Shain (eds),  Honour 
Among Nations: Treaties and Agreements with Indigenous People, Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne, 2004, p 190. 
21 Strelein, above n 20. 
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Aboriginal body set up to manage funds and deliver services, is for the 
first time firmly on the agenda.22
 
Similarly, Pearson23 points out that the High Court’s rejection of the doctrine of terra 
nullius was explicitly based on the rejection of 70 year old, racially discriminatory legal 
authority that some societies are ‘so low in the scale of social organisation’24 that the 
common law could not reocgnise them as a society with laws and rights in relation to 
their land.  
 
Indigenous groups have never desisted from demanding recognition of the political 
footprint upon which native title is based,25 despite what the Commonwealth Attorney-
General describes as a ‘spiteful culture war’ against native title,26 despite what Pearson 
describes as ‘ruthless, determined and resolute’27 opposition of all respondents to native 
title claims and despite the High Court’s reduction of native title to an exercise in 
statutory interpretation for remnant rights after all other interests are protected.28 
However, this political footprint has been routinely ignored by governments. Almost 
without exception, governments have isolated native title from policies seeking to 
improve Indigenous social and economic well being, despite such policies overtly 
targeting political issues such as partnerships, good governance, capacity building, 
sustainability and ‘whole of government’ outcomes. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commissioner observes that ‘by disregarding native title, the broader policy on 
Indigenous economic and social development fails to understand the importance of 
filtering development through the cultural values and structures of the community’.29
 
In their research on agreements with Indigenous peoples Marcia Langton, Maureen 
Tehan, Lisa Palmer and Kathryn Shain have observed that, whilst the political footprint 
of native title is not overtly recognised by governments, recognition of political aspects of 
native title have begun to develop in practice through the culture of agreement making 
generated by native title. ‘[I]t is this culture, within and outside the native title process, 
that begins to engage Aboriginal polities and Aboriginal jurisdictions.’30 Similarly, 
Strelein comments that whilst native title rights have been narrowed by the courts, 
paradoxically agreement making has expanded concepts of Indigenous autonomy, 
                                                 
22 Peter Yu, ‘Aboriginal Rights and Governance: A Kimberley Perspective’, paper presented at Indigenous 
Governance Conference, Canberra, 3-5 April, 2002. 
23 Noel Pearson, ‘Where We’ve Come From and Where We’re At with the Opportunity that is Koiki 
Mabo’s Legacy to Australia’, Mabo Lecture presented at the National Native Title Conference, Alice 
Springs, 3 June 2004. 
24 Re Southern Rhodesia (Privy Council) [1919] AC 211. 
25 Marcia Langton and Lisa Palmer, ‘Treaties, Agreement Making and the Recognition of Indigenous 
Customary Polities’, in Honour Amongst Nations, above n 20, p.43. 
26 McClelland, above n 4, para.14. 
27 Pearson, above n 23. 
28 For a general discussion on the High Court’s treatment of native title, see Noel Pearson, ‘Land is 
Susceptible of Ownership’ in Honour Amongst Nations?, above n 20, p.83. 
29 Tom Calma, ‘Promoting Economic and Social Development through Native Title’, Land, Rights, Laws: 
Issues of Native Title, vol. 2, no. 28, 2004, p.3. 
30 Marcia Langton, Maureen Tehan, Lisa Palmer and Kathryn Shain, ‘Introduction’, Honour Among 
Nations?, above n 20, p.20. 
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authority and jurisdiction.31 A significant reason for this appears to be that agreement 
making, however fraught with power imbalance, forces governments and resource 
companies to negotiate with Indigenous people face to face. As Strelein suggests, the 
ability to separate the substance of native title (a living tradition of laws and customs) 
from its mere symbolic recognition is much more difficult when directly confronted by 
Indigenous representatives and cultural leaders whose rights and obligations are affected 
by the agreement. 
 
The Commonwealth’s new resolve to include native title as part of its whole of 
government approach to Indigenous issues, rather than merely a legal doctrine relating to 
real estate, is a great leap forward. But to effect durable change, governments must also 
reocgnise the political footprint of Mabo and the living political economy of many 
Indigenous groups.  
What Works? An Evidenced Based Approach for Linking Native Title, 
Economic Development and Indigenous Governance  
Minister Macklin has rightly demanded that the new approach to native title is one that 
‘stringently examines the facts and makes policy decisions based on “what works”’.32 
The most credible research on the nexus between durable Indigenous economic 
development and political structures is the work of the Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development (‘the Harvard Project’).33
 
Since 1987, the Harvard Project has undertaken a systematic, comparative study of social 
and economic development on American Indian reservations in order to assess and foster 
the conditions under which sustained social and economic development can be achieved. 
The Harvard Project’s key research finding is that economic development is first and 
foremost a political problem about what cultural systems of governance are empowered 
by economic development and who has effective decision-making power in relation to 
such development. The Harvard Project identifies two contrasting approaches to 
economic and political development which underpins this finding. 
 
First, the ‘standard approach’ is primarily responsive to external proposals for economic 
development on American Indian reservations and dependent upon government funding. 
The concept of Indigenous culture, traditional laws and authority systems are generally 
viewed as an obstacle to this external development (except as a tourist opportunity). The 
Harvard Project identifies this approach as resulting in failed enterprises, internal conflict 
over control of political resources and perceptions by outsiders of incompetence and 
chaos, necessarily undermining confidence in Indigenous peoples’ ability to engage in the 
broader community. Unquestionably, this is the experience of most remote Australian 
Indigenous communities. 
                                                 
31 Strelein, above n 20. 
32 Macklin, above n 5. 
33 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, The Harvard Project on American 
Indian Economic Development, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, viewed 29 
April 2009, < www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/>. 
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The second approach is defined as a ‘nation building model of economic development’ 
where Indian nations are building self determined economies. Key features of this model 
are:  
 
• effective governing institutions based on the concept of cultural match or 
governance structures that fit the groups contemporary, culturally based standards 
of what is legitimate;  
• economic developments that have a cultural match by reflecting the needs and 
aspirations of the community as a cultural entity and not merely isolated 
individuals or groups; and 
• culturally legitimate systems of leadership. 
 
The Harvard Project found that within American Indian communities, the nation building 
model results in a more effective use of resources, sustained economic development and 
effective community structures. It is an approach that helps create communities, and not 
just economies, that work.  
 
Research in Australia on effective, economic development for Indigenous communities 
reflects similar findings. A ground-breaking study into Aboriginal participation in the 
East Kimberley economy undertaken almost twenty years ago by the Kimberley Land 
Council (KLC) in partnership with the Australian National University identified that 
public funding of Indigenous organisations was the mainstay of the regional economy.34 
However, for Indigenous people, this was a false economy. The beneficiaries of public 
investment were primarily non local people who delivered government services, public 
funding circulated in a chaotic manner between government agencies with few linkages 
and through non-traditionally based Indigenous corporations. This false economy 
provided little hope of changing the appalling impoverishment of the majority of 
Indigenous people in the region.  
 
The research argued that this waste of public investment through inappropriate and 
inefficient service delivery not only failed Indigenous communities but failed the tax 
payer, a complaint that has unsurprisingly received a sonorous national voice over many 
years. The research advocated that to ensure a return on public investment a better 
strategy was to create an integrated, regional approach to Indigenous social and economic 
development, responsive to the cultural aspirations and traditionally-based governance 
structures of its community. As Yu, who was involved in establishing the research, has 
since stated: 
 
The Harvard Project in North America proves with irrefutable empirical 
data what many Aboriginal Australian people have intuitively known. 
That the deplorable economic and social circumstances in our 
communities will change for the better only when Aboriginal communities 
                                                 
34 G. Crough, and C. Christopherson, Aboriginal People in the Economy of the Kimberley Region, North 
Australia Research Unit, Australian National University, Darwin, 1993. 
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can construct their own systems of governance and plan for their people’s 
long term development.35
 
Twenty years after the KLC’s original research, Kimberley traditional owners continue to 
advocate for such culturally appropriate governance structures in their negotiations with 
developers through the international standard of informed consent.36  
  
More recent research by Mick Dodson and Dianne Smith on the political economy of 
Indigenous communities states that good governance is internationally recognised as a 
key ingredient for sustainable development, where ‘governance’ is fundamentally about 
the legitimacy of decision-making power, processes of representation and  
accountability.37 After reviewing the evidence of the Harvard Project and other 
international research, Dodson and Smith argue that: 
 
international evidence for the merits of this approach (for both Indigenous 
and non Indigenous groups) is clear. It is only when effective governance 
and holistic development strategies are in place that economic and other 
development projects have a chance of becoming sustainable ... In other 
words, sustainable development is - fundamentally – a governance issue.38
 
Dodson and Smith’s research underlines that the legitimacy of effective Indigenous 
governance is directly related to cultural mandate or the ‘cultural match’ referred to in the 
Harvard Project. They note that one of the greatest challenges for Indigenous peoples will 
be to integrate economic activity with their social and cultural priorities and effective 
governance systems, so that informed consent to development can occur. 
 
Each community and region will have to find some degree of ‘match’ or 
common ground between the types of governing structures and procedures 
it wants to develop and the culturally based standards, values and systems 
of authority of community members … The more a governing body finds 
some cultural ‘fit’ or ‘match’ in these matters, the more it will secure the 
ongoing mandate of its members. ... Cultural match is not simply a matter 
of importing romanticised views of traditional Indigenous structures or 
authority and expecting them to handle economic development decisions, 
financial accounts and daily business management. Creating a cultural 
                                                 
35 Yu, above n 22. 
36 Wayne Bergmann, ‘A New Way of Doing Business: Economic Empowerment for Aboriginal People to 
Ensure Responsible Resource Development in the Kimberley’, paper presented to the National Press Club, 
Canberra, 30 April 2008. 
37 Mick Dodson and Dianne E Smith, Governance for Sustainable Development: Strategic Issues and 
Principles for Indigenous Australian Communities, Discussion Paper No. 250, Centre for Aboriginal 
Economic Policy Research, Canberra, 2003. See also Patrick Sullivan’s findings of the central role of 
cultural mandate and legitimacy in developing durable agreements with Indigenous communities Strange 
Bedfellow: Whole-of-Government Policy, Shared Responsibility Agreements and Implications for Regional 
Governance, Background Paper, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra 18 October 
2005. 
38 Dodson and Smith, above n 37, p.12. 
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match is more about developing strategic and realistic connections 
between extant cultural values and standards, and those required by the 
world of business and administration … it is about ‘cultural 
appropriateness with teeth’.39
 
Dodson and Smith emphasise that the hard work of developing such governance 
structures can only be done at the local level, with appropriate government and other 
support. They conclude that current research indicates that without a focus on such 
development, communities will struggle to make informed decisions about what 
economic developments to locally support. Consequently, sustained development will be 
unlikely and valuable opportunities squandered.40  
Specific Agreements 
The Burrup, MG-Ord and Wimmera agreements include different levels of economic, 
social, political and legal benefits and, at the time of the 2006 workshop which forms the 
basis of this paper, they represented the Australian native title agreements most consistent 
with the concept of comprehensive settlements.41  In order to contextualise observations 
from the workshop, the following provides a brief overview of the history, process and 
outcomes of each agreement. 
 
Burrup Agreement 
 
Following decades of planning for the expansion of industrial development in the 
Western Pilbara, the State of Western Australia issued compulsory acquisition notices for 
the construction of heavy industry estates on the Burrup Peninsula and adjacent Maitland 
area in January 2000. The notices covered 52 square kilometres and the proposed 
industrial estates were intended to contain a number of downstream gas-processing 
plants, associated infrastructure facilities and land for associated residential and 
commercial requirements in nearby Karratha.  
    
As detailed by Frances Flanagan the area subject to the compulsory acquisition notices 
presented specific challenges.42 Three overlapping, registered native title applications 
existed – the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi, Yaburara Mardudhunera and Wong-Goo-To-
                                                 
39 Dodson and Smith, above n 37, pp.18-19. 
40 Dodson and Smith, above n 37, pp.18-20. 
41 Since the research workshop in May 2006, two further agreements have been settled which reflect the 
concept of comprehensive settlements: in March 2007 the Gunditmara native title consent determination 
(Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474 and ancillary agreements < 
(see Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, Gunditjmara native title consent determinaton, Victorian 
Government Solicitor’s Office, Victoria, viewed 29 April 2009,   
<http://www.vgso.vic.gov.au/news/gunditjmaranativetitleconsentdetermination.aspx>); and in April 2009 
an in principle agreement between the Yawuru native title holders and the WA Government in relation to 
land use and compensation. Office of Native Title (WA) website, Whats New, Department of the Premier 
and Cabinet, viewed 29 April 2009, <http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/>. 
42 Frances Flanagan, ‘The Burrup Agreement: A Case Study in Future Act Negotiation’, Agreements 
Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Projects website, pp.1-3.< http://www.atns.net.au/papers/>. 
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Oo claims – which were part heard by the Federal Court. The Pilbara Native Title 
Service43 had only recently been recognised as the native title representative body for the 
region, had established only minimalist relationships with the native title claimants and 
had inherited a situation where it legally represented only the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi 
application. The Burrup Peninsula contains Indigenous rock art of local and international 
significance. There were five proponents proposing multibillion dollar investments and 
the State was a newly elected Labor Government keen to establish its economic and 
native title credentials.  
 
The State set the extremely short timeframe of three months to complete an agreement in 
these circumstances. This was extended to six months and agreement was reached with 
the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and the Yaburara Mardudhunera on 2 July 2002. 
Following protacted mediation and arbitration by the National Native Title Tribunal, the  
Wong-Goo-To-Oo also eventually signed the agreement. On 16 January 2003 the Burrup 
and Maitland Industrial Estates Agreement Implementation Deed was executed between 
all three registered native title claim groups and the State.44
 
The Agreement provides that, in exchange for the extinguishment of native title for 
industrial, residential and commercial purposes over 52 square kilometres, all three native 
title groups received: 
 
• freehold title to Burrup non industrial land subject to: 
o existing interests (such as easements); 
o immediate lease-back of freehold to the State for 99 years (with 99 year 
option to renew the lease) and prohibition of sale of land unless offered to 
the State first for a nominal amount; 
o comanagement agreement with WA Conservation and Land Management 
Department (CALM) with specified conditions (including only 
recreational development on the coastal strip);45 
o funding to CALM for an independent study to develop a management plan 
($500,000) and for management of land ($450,000 per annum for 5 years); 
o $5,500,00 for a Visitors Cultural Centre; and 
o infrastructure funding ($2.5 million); 
• 5% of developed lots in Kararatha; 
• $150, 000 upon signing, $2 million on date of first taking order, $2.3 million after 
leases granted to current proponents and proponents make first shipments and 
ongoing annual payments if current or future proponents use land; 
                                                 
43 The Yamatji Marlpa Bana Baba Maaja Aboriginal Corporation is the representative body for the Yamatji 
region and manages the Pilbara Native Title Service. 
44 Documents relating to the agreement variously state that it was signed on 1 November 2002 as well as 16 
January 2002.  
45 Now the Department of Environment and Conservation. Consistent with the language of the the Burrup 
and MG-Ord Agreements, the paper maintains the reference to the Department of Conservation and Land 
Management (CALM).  
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• $150,000 to a consultant to establish an Approved Body Corporate to hold the 
freehold grants, receive and distribute financial benefits equally between members 
and support Aboriginal students in education and training; 
• $5.5 million over 4 years for administration of the Approved Body Corporate; 
• $600,000 over 3 years for Employment Service Provider in Roebourne to conduct 
an audit of the skills of local Aboriginal people, conduct analysis of employment 
opportunities and assist people to achieve employment; 
• 5% Aboriginal employment target for proponents or payment of $4,500 to 
Employment Service Provider per person below target; 
• $3.5 million for the Roebourne Enhancement Scheme to address housing, 
transport, agency coordination concerns and asbestos removal; and 
• a Rock Art Study to monitor emissions. 
 
It was agreed that the benefits endured for all three groups regardless of who the Federal 
Court determined were the native title holders and regardless if the Court determined that 
that native title was extinguished. In 2003, the Federal Court determined the Ngarluma 
and Yindjibarndi as the native title holding group for the area. The Yaburara 
Mardudhunera  and the Wong-Goo-To-Oo were determined to be part of the Ngarluma 
and Yindjibarndi and not separate groups. Non-exclusive rights were recognised over part 
of the claim area but native title on the Burrup Peninsula was determined to be 
extinguished. 
 
MG-Ord Agreement 
 
Since the 1960s, the State of Western Australia has developed land in the East Kimberley 
for the Ord River irrigation scheme, including damming the Ord River to form Lake 
Kununurra and Lake Argyle, establishing Kununurra and developing 14,000 hectares of 
farm land. This development is referred to as Ord Stage 1. The State has been committed 
to expanding the scheme for many years into what is referred to as Ord Stage 2.  
 
The area subject to the Ord irrigation scheme is primarily the traditional country of the 
Miriuwung and Gajerrong people. In 1995, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong lodged two 
native title determination applications and their first claim (‘MG#1’) was the first 
litigated under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’). After eight years in litigation 
MG#1 was subject to a consent determination of native title on 9 December 2003. The 
second claim (‘MG#2’ which in 2004 was amended and re-filed as ‘MG#4’) was subject 
to a consent determination on 24 November 2006.46  
 
During 2001-2002, the State and the Miriuwung and Gajerrong agreed to adopt a 
partnership approach to the expansion of the Ord Stage 2 scheme. The Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong made it a  threshold requirement for entering into any discussions about Ord 
Stage 2 that the State fund an Aboriginal social and economic impact assessment 
(ASEIA) of Ord Stage 1 and that any Ord Stage 2 negotiations include reparations for 
impacts identified by this assessment. The ASEIA Report,  Fix the Past-Move to the 
                                                 
46 Ward v Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848. 
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Future was presented in March 2004 at the commencement of the MG-Ord 
negotiations.47
 
On 10 December 2003, the State abandonded its partnership approach and advised that 
compulsory acquisition notices would be issued for  65,000 hectares of land covered by 
the MG#1 determination and the (then) MG#2 application to facilitate Ord Stage 2. 
Although the State set a timeframe of one year for a negotiated outcome before 
compulsory acquisition would commence, this timeframe stretched into 22 months48 and 
the MG-Ord Agreement was signed on 5 October 2005.49
 
The key benefits for the State from the MG-Ord Agreement are: 
 
• acquisition and extinguishment of native title over 70,000 hectares of land; and 
• the Agreement represents full and final compensation for all matters relating to 
Ord Stage 1, Ord Stage 2, the MG #1 determination and the then undetermined 
MG#4  application.  
 
Benefits for the Miriuwung and Gajerrong are as follows. 
 
• Miriuwung and Gajerrong Corporation (MG Corporation) 
$100,000 to set up the MG Corporation and $1 million per annum operational 
funds for 10 years. The composition of the MG Corporation executive is to be the 
same as the executive of the MG#1 (and subsequent MG#4) prescribed body 
corporate to rationalize meetings and the prescribed body corporate is to delegate 
administrative tasks to the MG Corporation. 
 
• Miriuwung and Gajerrong Investment Trust (MG Investment Trust) 
Establishment of an MG Investment Trust with $5 million up front and $1 million 
per annum over 9 years. 50% of profit from the MG Investment Trust to be 
remitted back to the Trust and 50% available for Miriuwung and Gajerrong 
community ventures. 
 
• Ord Enhancement Scheme (OES) 
The OES is an innovative partnership between the Miriuwung and Gajerrong and 
the State and is in response to the Fix the Past – Move to the Future Report on the 
                                                 
47 Kitty Kahn,  Fix the Past-Move to the Future: An Aboriginal and Economic Social Impact Assessment of 
Ord Stage 1, Kimberley Land Council, Broome, 2004. 
48 During that time, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong and the State entered into a Framework Agreement, a 
Heritage Agreement, an ‘in principle’ Memorandum of Understanding and worked through approximately 
twenty three drafts of the final agreement. 
49 The MG-Ord Agreement comprises an Indigenous land use agreement and a s31 NTA agreement for 
compulsory acquisition in certain circumstances and stretches to around 400 pages.  In light of the required 
number of original copies, execution of the two agreements by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong required 
around two thousand signatures from thirty (mainly elderly) people. This was achieved in difficult 
circumstances within only seven hours, an indication of the level of commitment of the community to the 
Agreement. 
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Aboriginal social and economic impacts of Ord Stage 1.50  $11.195 million over 4 
years is provided to develop partnerships with the public and private sector to 
address priority economic and social issues identified in the Report. Projects are 
approved by a committee of seven Miriuwung and Gajerrong representatives and 
one State representative (the Chief Executive Officer of the Kununurra based 
Kimberley Development Commission). The OES is housed within the Kimberley 
Development Commission and reports to both the MG Corporation and the 
Minister for the Kimberley.51  
 
• Commercial land 
5% of irrigated farm land with 5% buy in option at cost through the Aboriginal 
Development Package (if private developer) and up to 2.5% buy in at commercial 
rates. 5% of town land released for housing and industrial development with 5% 
buy-in at cost through the Aboriginal Development Package (if private developer) 
and up to 5% buy in at commercial rates in certain circumstances. 
 
• Freehold grants 
Freehold title to 50,000 hectares (known as Yardungarrl) which includes eight 
community living areas. Freehold title to a further eleven community living areas. 
MG Corporation to pay stamp duty and transfer costs. Three additional grants of 
freehold inside and outside Kununurra with some funds for stamp duty, transfer 
costs and an access road to one block. Native title extinguished by all grants. 
 
• Environmental buffer 
Freehold title to the environmental buffer zones around the largest agricultural 
areas with lease back for 1000 years (100 years with a 9 by 100 option to renew) 
to an Environmental Management Entity (EME) for not rent. Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong representation on the EME. Native title subject to non extinguishment 
principle and Miriuwung and Gajerrong retain access for traditional purposes. 
 
• Aquaculture lease 
First option for an aquaculture lease on Lake Argyle subject to time limits. 
 
• Conservation Parks 
o Freehold to 150,000 hectares of current and new conservation parks with 
lease back to the Department of Conservation and Land Management 
(CALM) for 200 years (100 years with an option to renew for 100 years) 
at no rent. Joint management with CALM with $1 million to set up joint 
management plan, $1m for infrastructure and $4 million over 4 years to 
run parks. All funds channeled through CALM. 
o Miriuwung and Gajerrong hold veto regarding leases and licenses for 
commercial interests. 
                                                 
50 Kahn, above n 47. 
51 MG Corporation, Ord Enhancement Scheme, Yawoorroong Miriuwung Gajerrong Yirrgeb Noong 
Dawang Aboriginal Corporation (MG Corporation) website, viewed 29 April 2009,   
<yawoorroongmgcorp.com.au/oes/oes.html.>. 
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o At least 50% of parks jobs for Miriuwung and Gajerrong. 
o Right of access for Miriuwung and Gajerrong culture. 
o Native title subject to non-extinguishment principle, however 
compensation for compulsory acquisition is limited to compensation for 
acquisition of freehold or native title, whichever is higher.  
 
• Reserve 31165 
Joint management with Waters and River Commission (WA) of a large reserve 
adjacent to Lake Argyle. Access permitted to Miriuwung and Gajerrong for 
traditional purposes. 
 
• Aboriginal Development Package 
No employment targets set. MG Corporation must set up a register of potential 
contractors or employees, and developers are to target ‘registered’ Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong people. Equity rights in commercial lands at cost as set out above. 
 
Wimmera Agreement 
 
Three native title applications were lodged between 1995-1997 on behalf of the 
Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wegaia and Jupagalk peoples over 9642 square 
kilometres of Crown land located throughout the Wimmera region in western Victoria. 
 
In October 2002, the State reached an ‘in-principle’ agreement to settle all three 
applications by consent and an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA). The 
Commonwealth agreed one year later. Following lengthy National Native Title Tribunal 
(NNTT) mediation with the other 400 parties with minor interests, the ILUA was signed 
in July 2005 and registered in November 2005 and consent determinations reocgnised by 
the Federal Court in December 2005.52
 
Consent Determination 
Recognition of non exclusive native title to Crown reserves over 269 sq km of land (but 
not waters) along the Wimmera River (2.8% of the native title application area).  This 
title is comprised of the right to hunt, fish, gather and camp for personal, domestic and or 
non-commercial needs in accordance with both traditional law and customs and an agreed 
coexistence protocol which co-ordinates the exercise of rights. 
 
ILUA 
The key aspects of the ILUA are as follows. 
 
• It covers 35,859 square kilometres of land. 
• The validation of future acts otherwise invalid because of the NTA (other than 
intermediate period acts). 
• No right to future compensation for any future acts as ILUA in settlement of all 
previous and future ‘future acts’. 
                                                 
52 Above n 17. 
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• Recognition of close cultural ties to approximately 30% of the original claim area 
and consultation rights about certain development in this area. 
• Streamlined approval processes for traditional owners to obtain licenses to hunt, 
fish, gather and conduct cultural events in area in excess of 30% of original claim 
area. 
• Cooperative management arrangements for state forests and national parks 
(approximately 20% of original claim area), with traditional owners being a 
majority in decision-making process (7 traditional owners, three State 
representatives). 
• Freehold to three culturally significant areas (15.7 hectares). 
• Funding for a cultural/community centre ($793,000). 
• Funding for administration of Barengi Gadjin Land Council Aboriginal 
Corporation RNTBC ($1.6 million over 5 years). 
Observations from the Workshop and Analysis 
The Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS) 
convened a two day workshop in Canberra on 9-10 May 2006 on the process and 
outcomes of the Burrup, MG-Ord and Wimmera agreements. As previously noted, the 
aim of the workshop was to assess the utility of comprehensive settlements in progressing 
Indigenous and State aspirations for native title and where possible to identify 
benchmarks (in relation to both process and outcomes) for future settlements.  
 
The workshop participants were representatives of: the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi, the 
Miriuwung and Gajerrong, the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagulk 
peoples and members of their negotiation teams; State native title offices of Western 
Australia, New South Wales and South Australia; the Commonwealth Department of 
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the Attorney 
General’s Department; the Federal Court; the NNTT and native title representative 
bodies. Mr Chris Athanasiou, lead negotiator for the State of Western Australia in the 
Burrup and MG-Ord negotiations attended in his personal capacity. Professor Marcia 
Langton,53 Professor Ciaran O’Fairchellaigh,54 Mr Roger Cook,55 Mr Bill Lawrie56 and 
Ms Maureen Tehan57 attended as invited experts.
 
At the time of the workshop, the Victorian Government was in the process of developing 
a new approach to native title agreements and no officer felt in a position to attend. Mr 
John Caitlin, former head of the Victorian native title office who oversaw the Wimmera 
                                                 
53 Chair, Australian Indigenous Studies, University of Melbourne and Chief Investigator- Agreements, 
Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Research Project. 
54 School of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith University. 
55 Former Executive Director of Yamatji Marlpa Bana Baba Maaja Aboriginal Corporation, including 
during the Burrup negotiations, and fomer Executive Director of the South West Land and Sea Council 
during discussions about a comprehensive settlement of the Noongar native title application. 
56 Manager Native Title, South West Land and Sea Council, former Manger Native Title Ngaanyatjarra 
Council and former Kimberley Regional Manager, NNTT. 
57 Chief Investigator, Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Research Project and Senior 
Lecturer, Law School, University of Melbourne. 
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negotiations and currently a Member of the NNTT, attended in his personal capacity to 
present his experience of the Wimmera negotiations. An annotated workshop attendance 
list is provided at Attachment A.  
 
The first day of the workshop was devoted to traditional owners discussing their 
experiences, with their respective negotiating teams and invited experts adding their 
views. Markedly, the traditional owners’ comments focused on the political aspects of 
native title rather than the minutiae of specific benefits. Traditional owners highlighted 
the need for negotiating parties to reocgnise and respect: 
 
• their political status as traditional owners with a living tradition of laws and 
customs; 
• native title as a valuable property right; 
• adequately funded, culturally appropriate, decision-making processes and realistic 
timeframes to exercise such processes; 
• adequate funding of implementation strategies which built capacity in traditional 
owner communities; 
• the political aspects of negotiating with a community of native title holders, 
particularly the ease with which individual members of the community can seek 
to disrupt negotiations. 
  
These key issues, along with the persectives of the Office of Native Title (WA) 
representatives and Caitlin on the strengths and weaknesses of the Burrup and MG-Ord 
agreements and Wimmera agreement respectively were subject to very lively discussion 
at the plenary session on the second day of the workshop. The following analysis is 
structured around these key issues and in that sense is weighted towards the views of the 
Indigenous participants. However, the paper seeks to reflect all aspects of the workshop, 
primarily in the words of participants to avoid misrepresentation. For ease of reference 
the representatives of the Miriwung and Gajerrong, Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and 
Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagulk are designated throughout the 
paper (as MG, NY or W). The observations are only the opinions of participants at the 
time of the workshop based on their experiences. Interestingly the opinions of relevant 
parties and invited experts was remarkably uniform across the different agreements. The 
analysis of these opinions are mine and do not necessarily represent the views of any 
participant. 
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Respect for Status as Traditional Owners  
Positive Recognition of Right to Speak for Country 
 
The overarching, positive outcome for each traditional owner group was that each 
negotiation marked the first time the state had recognised their fundamental native title 
right to speak for their country.58 The process of negotiation was experienced as an 
emotionally raw opportunity to rectify historical injustice. Desmond Hill (MG) said 
people were ‘fighting from the heart’, negotiating for a future out of welfare and 
socioeconomic marginalisation whereas the State were seen as just ‘fighting for money’. 
Jenny Beer (W) succinctly observed ‘I said to the government people this is only your 
job. For us it is our life, our lifetime.’ 
 
The right to speak for their country was not experienced by traditional owners as mere 
recognition of a formal legal requirement that may lead to some material benefits. The 
right to speak was experienced as an historic, formal acknowledgement of their political 
identity as traditional owners. Michelle Adams (NY) stated that ‘the most encouraging 
thing about the Burrup Agreement was the opportunity to sit at the table.  That was more 
than we have ever had before’. Jenny Beer (W) identified recognition of Wimmera law 
and custom through a consent determination as the critical benefit of the Wimmera 
negotiations, despite the recognition area being less than 3% of their native title 
application and the significant compromises made by the traditional owners in consenting 
to the State’s offer. Jenny Beer (W) stated that the consent determination and ILUA 
ensured the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagulk peoples’ 
identification as traditional owners by both Indigenous and non Indigenous groups. She 
also noted that the agreement assisted the broader local community to recognise that 
traditional owners have ‘to walk a hard road between two cultures’ and, in this sense, 
recognition became part of a local reconciliation process.  
 
For the Miriuwung and Gajerrong, the most positive aspect of the negotiations was 
establishment of the Ord Enhancement Scheme. As described above, the Ord 
Enhancement Scheme is in response to the Fix the Past-Move to the Future report on the 
Indigenous social and economic impacts of Ord Stage 1. The Report described the 
damming of Lake Argyle as akin to a natural disaster for local Indigenous people, 
detailed the shelved reports that described the negative impacts for Indigenous people of 
this natural disaster and made recommendations on health, housing, education and other 
social issues that must be addressed to alleviate these impacts. According to Desmond 
Hill (MG), when the Report was presented at the commencement of the MG-Ord 
negotiations it ‘wrong–footed the State and made everyone look up and take notice of 
us’. The Ord Enhancement Scheme is the State’s primary response to this report. In a real 
recognition of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong’s right to speak for their country on matters 
other than future acts, the Ord Enhancement Scheme ensures the Miriuwung and 
                                                 
58 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 para.13. 
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Gajerrong have a level of direct control in regional decisions affecting their socio-
economic wellbeing. 
 
Similarly, the Wimmera ILUA was identified as providing a right to speak for country on 
issues not prescriptively limited to formal future acts. Jenny Beer (W) stated that whereas 
the former State cultural heritage legislation only required Government departments to 
talk to Indigenous people (and not necessarily traditional owners) about developments 
that may affect sacred sites, the ILUA requires the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, 
Wergaia and Jupagulk to be formally involved in a range of decision-making processes 
affecting all the area where they are recognised as having close cultural ties. Jenny Beer 
(W) stated that: 
 
for a long time we have been locked out of decision-making. In our area, 
salinity is very high due to clearing. Now we are going to have a say, not 
just over sacred sites or cultural sites scattered over the place, but a say in 
the whole landscape. 
 
Failures to Respect Traditional Ownership and Native Title 
 
Despite the positive aspects of recognition of their political status as traditional owners, 
significant sadness, frustration and anger was expressed by traditional owners at the 
ongoing failure of the State to step outside narrow legal boundaries and engage with them 
as political partners in negotiations over their country, where their traditional laws and 
customs were meaningfully acknowledged and respected.59 Patrick Dodson60 observed 
that: 
 
the State approaches native title agreements in two ways. Firstly it issues 
section 29 notices, which place native title holders under duress and grants 
the legal advantage to the State. Secondly, by doing so, it locks us into 
negotiations … We need to find creative ways to deal with Government. 
 
Similarly Cook noted that governments approached negotiations from a purely legal 
angle of statutory obligations, rather than a more expansive recognition of rights. 
Athanasiou agreed that the State of Western Australia characterised the Burrup and Ord 
negotiations as future act determinations and that this was a legitimate exercise in 
‘standing in on behalf of the proponent and handling the land use issues in advance of the 
final proponents development the land’ rather than more expansive negotiations’. 
 
The most explicit frustration came from the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi representatives. 
Describing his experience of the negotiations, Trevor Solomon (NY) did not choose to 
list items in the benefits package, but instead stated the following. 
 
                                                 
59 Lisa Strelein has similarly commented that ‘the failure of governments to understand the connection 
between the recognition of native title and agreement making on a sovereign-to-sovereign scale can be a 
source of immense frustration.’ Strelein, above n 20, p.201.  
60 Lead negotiator for the Miriuwung and Gajerrong. 
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How do you get through to government, to white man, when they don’t want 
to hear, not interested. We fight hard, stand united yet the white man doesn’t 
listen. Our law and our culture put aside. In the Burrup agreement, we got 
some stuff, but not what we wanted – no independence to do what we 
wanted to do. The spirit of the country is dying, so is the country around it. 
We are connected to the land, it speaks and talks to us. We can hear it. It 
cries out in pain when being bulldozed, blown up. 
 
Similarly, Michelle Adams (NY) described her experience of the negotiations as follows. 
 
There is deep resentment, distrust, deaths in custody, removal from land, no 
apologies. 30-40 % of State GDP comes out of the Pilbara yet the traditional 
owners live in poverty, third world conditions. What does that say about 
agreement making, compulsory acquisition and extinguishment? 
 
Being part of the negotiations was liked being stabbed in the stomach 
constantly. Negotiating under duress – the State has issued compulsory 
acquisition notices and will take your land anyway. Burrup is a highly 
religious, spiritual site. We didn’t want development but understood we had 
no veto. How do you value the loss of your cultural heritage? You can’t put 
a figure on that. Most stressful time imaginable – that’s our experience, 
that’s what we lived through. 
 
These comments indicate that for traditional owners, negotiations with the State carry an 
expectation of recognition by the State of a history of colonisation and an opportunity for 
dealing with the ‘unfinished business’ of this history. Negotiations are not seen by 
traditional owners as merely an opportunity for the State to ‘stand in the shoes of a 
proponent’ on strategic land use matters and to give only so much as is required by the 
NTA, a law that has been assessed by international human rights bodies as racially 
discriminatory in favour of non-Indigenous interests.61  
 
For the Miriuwung and Gajerrong, the State’s imposition of a narrow legal template 
during the negotiations was an affront to their unprecedented legal battle for native title. 
The MG#1 claim, filed in 1995, was subject to a Federal Court trial and determination,62 
Full Federal Court appeal,63 High Court appeal64 and then remitted backed to the Full 
Court. Following intensive mediation, a consent determination was recognised by the 
                                                 
61 For example, in 1999, acting under its early warning and urgent actions procedure (which had never 
previously been used against a developed country) the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination which monitors implementation of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination stated that the Native Title Act 1993 as amended in 1998 was racially discriminatory as it 
increased protection for non Indigenous interests through changes to the future act regime, confirmation of 
extinguishment provisions and validation of non compliant acts. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Decision (2)54 on Australia – Concluding observations/comments, 18 March 1999, viewed 
29 April 2009. <UN Doc CERD/C/54/Misc.40/Rev.2.CERD/C/54/Misc 40/Rev 2.> 
62 Ward v State of Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483. 
63 Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316. 
64 Above n 58. 
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Full Court on 9 December 200365 at a special sitting in Kununurra. The very next day, 
the State notified the Miriuwung and Gajerrong of its intention to issue compulsory 
acquisition notices for the extinguishment of native title over 65,000 hectares of land in 
both the MG#1 determination and the (then undetermined) MG#4 application, an 
intention which made the previous day’s consent determination a bitter, pyrrhic victory.  
 
Lack of Recognition of Native Title as a Valuable Property Right 
 
Across all three agreements, the lack of respect for traditional owners as political partners 
was most obvious in a failure by governments to recognise native title as a valuable 
property right that must be afforded commercial considerations during any negotiation.66
 
Dodson described the States’ choice not to recognise native title as a valuable property 
right as the ‘fundamentally discriminatory way in which the State deals with Aboriginal 
people with regard to tenure’. This criticism is not new. Government respondents to 
native title applications have consistently sought to define native title as something other 
than a property right and the High Court has romantically described Indigenous peoples’ 
relationship to country as primarily a ‘spiritual affair’.67 Seeking to empty native title of 
its economic, social and political basis undermines the Mabo decision’s rejection of the 
doctrine of terra nullius and justifies States treating native title as inferior to non-
Indigenous property rights with little commercial value during negotiations. 
 
The Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and Miriuwung and Gajerrong teams illustrated this 
discriminatory treatment of native title by identifying the ways in which various grants of 
land were treated in their benefits package. In these exchanges, native title is not treated 
as a commercially valuable property right, that can be traded for a valuable income 
stream and/or treated in a like manner to non-Indigenous property rights. These outcomes 
fail the standard of non-discriminatory treatment of competing interests that Pearson has 
identified as critical to ensuring native title negotiations are in the real interests of all 
parties.68 Consequentially, some participants characterised the negotiations as a retreat 
from ‘negotiation’ to welfare and largesse. 
 
Freehold with immediate leaseback 
 
• The only freehold grant to the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi was subject to an 
immediate leaseback to the Department of Conservation and Land Management 
(CALM) for 99 years (with a 99 year option to renew) at no rent. The freehold 
cannot be sold without the consent of the Minister. The land is subject to a 
management plan for environmental and Indigenous cultural heritage purposes. 
The State paid transfer costs and stamp duty.  
 
                                                 
65 Attorney-General of the Northern Territory v Ward  (2003) 134 FCR 16. 
66 Peter Yu has also expressed thie view privately to the author. 
67 Above n 58, para. 13. 
68 Pearson, above n 23. 
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• 150,000 hectares of freehold grants to the Miriuwung and Gajerrong over 
conservation parks were subject to an immediate lease back to CALM for 100 
years (with a 100 year option) at $1 rent per term and joint management is to be 
instituted between the State and the Miriuwung and Gajerrong. The freehold 
cannot be sold without giving first option to the State for $1. The non 
extinguishment principle applies to native title but the Miriuwung and Gajerrong 
have no future act rights for mining only ‘freeholder rights’. Compensation for 
any compulsory acquisition (subject to the future act right to negotiate) is only for 
the freehold interest or native title interest but not both. The Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong pay stamp duty and transfer costs. 
 
• Freehold grants to the Miriuwung and Gajerrong over environmental buffers 
around certain farm areas are subject to an immediate lease back to an 
Environmental Management Entity for 1000 years (100 years with 9 times 100 
year options) for $1 per term. The Miriuwung and Gajerrong are not able to sell 
the freehold without giving first option to the State for $1. The non 
extinguishment principle applies to native title but there are no future act rights 
for mining tenements only ‘freeholders rights’ and a future act ‘right to negotiate’ 
only for compulsory acquisition. Compensation for compulsory acquisition is 
only for freehold interest or native title interest, not both. The Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong have a role in the management of the buffer area and access for 
traditional enjoyment and use is ensured. The Miriuwung and Gajerrong to pay 
stamp duty and transfer costs. 
 
For each of these freehold grants, the distinctive characteristics of freehold are so absent 
that the term ‘freehold’ is little more than a legal shell. The legal restrictions on the grants 
deny the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and the Miriuwung and Gajerrong the fundamental 
rights of a freeholder to impose appropriate lease terms (a term of 1000 years is 
meaningless), to impose rent and to commercially deal with their land by market sale. At 
the same time, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong have the financial obligations of a 
freeholder to pay stamp duty and transfer costs of large areas of land. In relation to the 
conservation parks, the lack of meaningful rental arrangements are out of step with some 
other Australian parks.69  
 
Restricted use community living areas with no basic services 
 
• The Miriuwung and Gajerrong had the option of either unconditional or 
conditional freehold for 11 community living areas, with the condition being that 
the freehold could only be used for Aboriginal community living areas with 
limited economic use. Given this limitation on economic development, 
                                                 
69For example, the Northern Territory Government provides $100,000 per annum rent to the traditional 
owner corporation (Jawoyn Association) for the leaseback of the Nitmiluk (Katherine Gorge) National Park 
and 50% of park revenue. The government also funds infrastructure costs, public liability expenditure and 
Board administration costs. Other Australian parks with rental provisions include Uluru – Kata Tjuta, 
Kakadu, Booderee and Mutawintji. 
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unconditional freehold was the preference of the Miriuwung and Gajerrong. 
However if unconditional freehold was chosen, the State would not fund the legal 
requirement to construct a road to the community living area and therefore 
unconditional freehold could only be obtained by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong at 
significant financial cost. If conditional freehold was chosen, the State would pay 
for an access route. The Miriuwung and Gajerrong were required to pay transfer 
costs and stamp duty. Native title extinguished. 
 
• On either option, the State refused to commit to the provision of other basic 
services such as electricity. As Edna O’Malley (MG) commented, the irony of this 
was that ‘some communities sit along a power line [from the Ord dam hydro-
electric scheme] but are not connected to it, and have to rely on a generator.’ 
 
The Miriuwung and Gajerrong representatives stated that in their opinion, the restrictions 
placed on the grants of freehold over their community living areas stood in contrast to the 
terms of a freehold grant made to a corporate pastoral lessee during separate negotiations 
related to Ord Stage 2. Other MG team members noted that it also stood in contrast to the 
land that would be offered for future irrigated agriculture, which would be fitted up with 
all relevant infrastructure prior to sale. Whilst one explanation for this is that these 
private interests would pay for these ‘upgraded’ aspects of their freehold grants through 
the sale price, whereas the Miriuwung and Gajerrong were receiving such grants as a 
negotiated benefit, this perspective is based on commercially devaluing the wide scale 
extinguishment of native title for which the grants of community living areas were 
partially exchanged.  
 
Grant of 5% of Residential Development 
 
The Burrup and MG-Ord agreements include grants of 5% of residential lands developed 
by the State. However, unlike commercial negotiations where percentages are generally 
based upon a set of financial principles relative to the negotiation, the figure of 5% is 
unprincipled and unrelated to the specific facts of each situation.  
 
Participants commented that in relation to the release of residential lands, it would be 
logical for the State to grant a percentage of those lands that is closer to the relevant 
proportion of Indigenous people within the local population who are disproportionately 
reliant on State for housing. Given the current political emphasis on Indigenous home 
ownership, such a principled model would be a concrete way to assist traditional owners 
to engage in home ownership, whilst ensuring housing remains managed by a community 
corporation for community benefits. 
 
Imposition of ‘Extinguishment’ 
 
Another example of the failure of the State to respect traditional ownership and native 
title is the imposition of the legal concept of extinguishment.  Dodson, advocating outside 
the workshop for recognition of the political footprint of native title, has argued that ‘the 
concept of extinguishment has replaced the previous legal lie of terra nullius’: 
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We have to learn to celebrate native title rather than to encourage its 
extinguishment. We have to acknowledge that it’s not just property law, it’s not 
just a bundle if rights, but it’s about Aboriginal people. It’s about Aboriginal 
people’s rights to be the unique kinds of people that they are within our country. 
 
Extinguishment is a terrible word … for Indigenous people when extinguishment 
is applied it is not just about the right you hold in property. It is, in fact, about the 
nature of your being, of who you are, and how you relate and derive your 
meaning from a tract of land from which your spirit has arisen.70
 
Similarly, Michelle Adams (NY) stated during the workshop that ‘what’s different 
between our laws and customs and native title is extinguishment’, arguing that 
extinguishment is a ‘racist element’ of native title. 
 
As noted above, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong received compulsory acquisition notices 
for 65,000 hectares of their traditional lands the day after historic consent determination 
in MG#1. This potential level of extinguishment of their native title was 
incomprehensible to the traditional owners. Desmond Hill (MG) explained how the 
Miriuwung and Gajerrrong Steering Committee resisted the imposition of extinguishment 
month after month at negotiation meetings, ‘we wouldn’t let go’. Eventually, the freehold 
grants over the conservation parks and the buffer zones of land were subject to a 
restricted non-extinguishment principle (as described above). 
 
This energetic resistance to the legal concept of extinguishment indicates that traditional 
owners did not accept the State’s terms of the debate concerning native title and actively 
sought to renegotiate such terms in ways more aligned to their laws and customs. This 
renegotiation is legally possible in many instances under ILUAs but requires political will 
by governments and private interests to make agreements focused on respect for 
traditional laws and customs. 
Decision-Making Processes and Timeframes 
Traditional owners identified the key governance principle of culturally appropriate 
decision-making processes, facilitated through reasonable timeframes and adequate 
funding, as critical to the successful completion and durability of an agreement. 
 
Providing time and funding for culturally appropriate decision-making processes ensures 
traditional owners have the best opportunity to ‘own’ negotiated outcomes by developing 
the skills to understand and implement agreements in the long term. Developing these 
tools of self-reliance avoids further institutionalising reliance on non-Indigenous 
professionals to manage Indigenous affairs. As John Roberts71 noted in the workshop: 
 
                                                 
70 Patrick Dodson, ‘Reconciliation: Confronting the Truth’, keynote address presented to The Age 
Melbourne Writers Festival, 25 August 2000. 
71 Senior policy adviser for the Miriuwung and Gajerrong negotiating team. 
 25
There is no quick fix. Big bang, big buck agreements are not an investment in the 
long term. It is better that people are equipped to deal with disputes in the 
community, better to be able to ensure the agreement lasts and can be 
implemented. 
 
Forging the ability for traditional owners to directly manage agreements concerning their 
lives mirrors the Rudd Government’s emphatic commitment to a new Australian future 
‘based on mutual respect, mutual resolve and mutual responsibility’.72
 
Burrup Agreement 
 
In the Burrup negotiations, the nexus between time, resources, culturally appropriate 
decision-making and durable agreements is most clear. 
 
The Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi decision-making process was primarily dictated by the 
very short timeframe imposed by the State on the negotiations. Whilst the compulsory 
acquisition notices had been issued during early 2000, the State became serious about 
negotiating in December 2001 due to pressure from five multi-national corporations 
interested in gas exploitation in the area. Flanagan comments that: 
 
if all five proponents took leases, their proposed developments would involve 7 
billion dollars worth of capital expenditure, 3,500 direct and indirect jobs, and up to a 
billion dollars per annum expenditure in the Australian economy. Expenditure on 
capital alone was large enough to have a perceivable impact on the value of the 
Australian dollar in international currency markets.73
 
Keen to prove their ability to attract such investment, the new WA Labor Government 
gave the traditional owners four months to reach an agreement, a possibility Flanagan 
states one experienced negotiator described as ‘simply inconceivable’74 and which later 
rolled over into six months. This timeframe occurred during the time assigned for ‘law 
business’, when traditional owners generally refuse to engage in external matters and 
expect respect for their cultural beliefs. Flanagan writes that the Ngarluma and 
Yindibarndi were advised that the four month deadline ‘was a consequence of the 
immutable commercial deadlines of the five international companies’75 and that the 
timeframes were out of the State’s hands. 
 
The State’s deadline prohibited development of an agreed, culturally appropriate 
decision-making process which was relevant to such a large development. Helen 
Lawrence76 advised the workshop that to enable transparency, the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi defaulted to the daunting option that the whole community would be the 
negotiating committee. This proved an extremely difficult decision-making process for 
                                                 
72 Rudd, above n 2. 
73 Flanagan, above n 42, p.4. 
74 Flanagan, above n 42, p.4. 
75 Flanagan, above n 42, p.4. 
76 Principal Legal Officer, Yamatji Marlpa Bana Baba Maaja Aboriginal  Corporation and senior lawyer 
during the Burrup negotiations. 
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participants. The amount of meetings was intensive: the Pilbara Native Title Service 
conducted over thirty meeting in four months (approximately two per week), including 
night and day meetings to accommodate both employed and unemployed people and 
separate women’s meetings. Meetings would comprise approximately one hundred 
people in the room (together with children, dogs and the consequent distractions) trying 
to discuss complex issues and make informed decisions.77 The previously noted dispute 
about the correct native title group for the area exerted further pressure upon this fraught-
decision-making process. 
 
The process placed extraordinary pressure on the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi’s ability to 
realistically negotiate whilst coming to terms with the prospect of wide scale destruction 
of their land and culture. Michelle Adams (NY) stated that the community was: 
 
pushed into a corner – take it or leave it. We didn’t know how to 
negotiate. When you look at the population most couldn’t read or write. 
Few could articulate what they want or represent their people. We were 
under duress. I hate the government for doing that to us. No respect. They 
wanted meetings to discuss their business, but what about our business?  
 
This last comment again points to a view of native title negotiations as an opportunity for 
government to address the historical experience of traditional owners and to provide hope 
for a more self-reliant future, rather than a view that negotiations are merely a narrow 
future act matter. Michelle Adams (NY) further explained that the community’s concerns 
about their future extended to fears of how future generations would view their role in the 
agreement. She explained that: 
 
every meeting was video-taped and recorded due to our concern that our 
grandchildren would not know what had happened during the negotiations. 
We wanted a permanent record. 
 
Commenting on the State’s failure to appreciate this broader perspective, Cook stated that 
prior to the negotiations the Ngarluma and Yindibarndi had watched: 
 
20 years of grotesque amounts of money being spent around Roebourne 
[where many traditional owners lived] for mining and traditional owners 
did not receive a cent of it. Then finally when traditional owners have the 
right to negotiate, the State imposes oppressive time lines to make 
decisions regarding what may be the only shot in the locker for 
generations. It was an extraordinary achievement for the community to go 
from 0-150km per hour. But we must not lose sight of the stress for 
traditional owners owners and land council staff and what such timeframes 
cost in human capital terms.  
 
Whilst the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and their negotiation team managed to comply 
with the deadlines set by the State, Lawrence noted that the State would often fail to meet 
                                                 
77 Flanagan, above n 42, p.8. 
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its own deadlines due to its internal processes, a situation that did not assist in nurturing 
good faith. Due to the challenge of negotiating with a politically complex community (as 
opposed to a stable corporate entity) tardiness by the State potentially impedes 
negotiations. For example, Lawrence advised that a delay by the State in attending a 
meeting with one member of the Yaburara and Mardudhunera during authorisation 
inadvertently contributed to the outcome that the individual decided against signing the 
agreement, triggering an expensive, time-consuming and then unprecedented Federal 
Court application to amend the native title applicant.78
 
Athanasiou agreed the timeframes for the Burrup agreement were too short but that the 
agreement was the first of its kind and that the State was indebted to the good faith of the 
traditional owners to the process. He noted that the State had sought to implement more 
appropriate timeframes in the MG-Ord negotiations. However, it is unclear how this fits 
with the State’s comment that the timeframes in the Burrup agreement were ‘out of their 
hands’ due to the deadlines of commercial interests. Ironically, the original proponents 
never pursued these urgent interests, leaving open the question of what the real timeframe 
could have been if traditional owners and corporate interests were treated equally. 
 
In terms of the structure of the Burrup negotiations, Lawrence told the workshop that the 
initial months proceeded with a range of departmental officers taking contradictory 
positions and offering minimalist benefits such as the right to name roads. The Ngarluma 
and Yindjibarndi team identified two turning points in the process: the appointment of a 
State lead negotiator experienced in native title (Athanasiou) to channel one position 
from Government; and the traditional owners presenting a proposed benefits package 
contextualised by their historical experience in the region. Flanagan describes the 
presentation of this historical account and the proposed benefits package as an ‘emphatic 
success’79 which led to Cabinet committing to the negotiation of a more comprehensive 
agreement than previously anticipated. In terms of adequately funding the negotiations, 
Flanagan writes: 
 
The State’s funding contribution to the negotiation team was absolutely 
essential in enabling the community to give informed consent to the 
agreement. As well as assisting with the professional fees of the lead 
negotiator, State resources were used to employ locum practitioners to relieve 
the Land Council lawyers of their usual work responsibilities. The final result 
would have been inconceivable without the State’s commitment to adequately 
resourcing the community’s representatives.80
 
However, Lawrence noted to the workshop that the process for obtaining these funds was 
flawed. There was no agreed budget from the State and funding had to be applied for 
every couple of weeks, a cumbersome exercise redirecting precious human resources 
away from the substantive negotiations. 
                                                 
78 Section 66B of the NTA sets out the process for amending the applicant group for a native title claim in 
circumstances where a person or persons are not complying with the decisions of the group. Two 66B 
applications were required to be pursued by the representative body and both were successful. 
79 Flanagan, above n 42, p.13. 
80 Flanagan, above n 42, p. 6. 
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MG-Ord Agreement 
 
The Miriuwung and Gajerrong were able to develop the most successful, culturally 
appropriate decision-making process primarily because the State agreed to adequately 
fund the decision-making process established by the traditional owners and partly 
because the timeframes for negotiation, whilst tight, were manageable.  
 
Lead Negotiator 
 
The Kimberley Land Council deviated from the standard model of appointing a non-
Indigenous lawyer as the lead negotiator and put together a negotiation team led by  
Dodson. As well as a nationally recognised Indigenous leader, Dodson is a cultural law 
boss within his Yawuru community and by virtue of this cultural role was familiar with 
general aspects of Miriuwung and Gajerrong law and custom. Dodson’s appointment as 
lead negotiator for the Miriuwung and Gajerrong proved crucial in facilitating the 
negotiations in a number of respects. 
 
• Dodson was able to win the trust of senior Miriuwung and Gajerrong law bosses 
more easily than a non-Indigenous appointee in light of his ability to 
knowledgably engage with issues of traditional law and custom. 
• Dodson’s cultural and public standing generated trust with the Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong which was essential given a rocky historical relationship between the 
Kimberly Land Council and the Miriuwung and Gajerrong.81 By the end of the 
negotiations, certain individuals who had previously refused to instruct the 
Kimberley Land Council signed the MG-Ord Agreement. 
• Unlike a cultural outsider, Dodson was able to comprehend at a subtle level what 
was being articulated by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong and to translate such 
information, and the State’s response to it, in culturally appropriate ways. 
• Dodson’s status as a political leader rather than a lawyer focussed the negotiations 
away from narrow legal debates and onto broader political possibilities. 
 
Negotiation Rules and MG Steering Committee 
 
At the beginning of the negotiations, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong agreed upon two key 
rules based on the communal nature of native title: 
 
                                                 
81 The Aboriginal Legal Service (WA) and not the Kimberley Land Council was the primary legal 
representative for the lodging of MG#1 and MG#2 native title applications and the litigation of MG#1. 
However, the Kimberley Land Council separately represented some members of the claim group. During 
the litgation period, there was significant tension between the KLC and the ALS (WA) and the differently 
represented claimants. When the High Court remitted MG#1 back to the Full Court, the ALS (WA) was no 
longer reocgnised as a native title representative body and the Kimberley Land Council was required to 
become the solicitor on the record for all claimants. 
 29
• they would negotiate one agreement over all affected country and hence all 
benefits would be shared by all Miriuwung and Gajerrong and not just those 
whose traditional areas were to be worst affected; and 
• no individual benefits only community benefits. 
 
The lead negotiator was guided by a 26 person Miriuwung and Gajerrong Steering 
Committee. In accordance with traditional law and custom, the Steering Committee was 
only empowered to guide, or make interim decisions on, negotiated outcomes.  All final 
decisions were to be taken to the senior law bosses with ultimate responsibility for 
Miriuwung and Gajerrong country. 
 
The Steering Committee was a critical part of the machinery of the negotiations. It both 
advised the negotiating team and directly negotiated with the State at monthly meetings. 
This direct level of negotiation over all key aspects of the agreement (and the related 
work of the ASEIA sub-committee82) assisted the Steering Committee in gaining 
ownership and understanding of agreement outcomes and ensured individuals became 
increasingly confident in negotiation skills and the agreement’s implementation 
requirements. 
 
Desmond Hill (MG) identified the Steering Committee’s ability to directly negotiate with 
the State as a way of opening negotiation pathways outside of narrow legal parameters. 
 
The negotiation team would brief us, but the Steering Committee would 
argue with the State. Not the lawyers, not the team. This was good because 
the State’s negotiator had no idea what we would say - not professional to 
professional, not lawyer to lawyer. The team would then try to push State 
on specific issues we wanted. 
 
Dodson reiterated this point, advising that it was an important principle that the Steering 
Committee engage directly with the State’s lead negotiator. 
 
When I spoke, if we won a point on the basis of law, we lost on the basis 
of policy which operated as a screen for the State. But when the 
Committee grilled the State personally, the State was confronted. 
 
The Steering Committee was appointed and operated in accordance with traditional 
decision-making processes as instructed by senior Miriuwung and Gajerrong law bosses. 
It was comprised of a ‘senior’ and a ‘junior’ member of each dawang (local land owning 
group), where ‘senior’ and ‘junior’ were not assignations of age, but references to an 
individual’s position in Miriuwung and Gajerrong law, with junior delegates generally 
better able to engage with the language and concepts used during the negotiations.  
 
Workshop participants identified that a crucial outcome of the negotiations was the  
increased skills and capacity developed by Steering Committee whilst being involved in a 
                                                 
82 The Aboriginal Social and Economic Impact Assessment sub-committee was established to progress the 
recommendations of the report Fix the Past – Move to the Future, above n 47. 
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a culturally appropriate decision-making processes. This situation allowed a person’s 
developing skills to be grounded in a traditional identity whilst being capable of 
flexibility to non-Indigenous commercial and political requirements. As noted above, the 
Harvard Project and others have identified that a key benefit of negotiating within a 
native title context is engaging in a non-Indigenous political, social and economic 
environment whilst remaining grounded  in a community defined through traditional laws 
and customs. Roberts aptly observed that whilst the development history in the 
Kununurra region had impacted heavily on Miriuwung and Gajerrong cultural 
knowledge, and that the differential in such knowledge initially caused confusion and 
dissension within the Steering Committee: 
 
the Miriuwung and Gajerrong people were fortunate to have had strong 
senior law people to establish culturally appropriate decision-making 
protocols and dispute resolution procedures. Ultimately the labour-
intensive preparatory process that established the basis for decision-
making, combined with the disciplined negotiation process, proved very 
positive in building knowledge and confidence amongst the Miriuwung 
and Gajerrong. Many new leaders emerged during the process. 
 
An independent review of the Ord negotiations comissioned by the Office of Native Title 
(WA) similarly highlights the crucial role this culturally appropriate decision-making 
process played in the success of the negotiations.83  
 
The focus on traditional decision-making processes has contributed to a strengthening 
and rejuvenation in respect of Miriuwung and Gajerrong law over land. Participants gave 
a recent example of a long running internal dispute over land which was resolved in 
accordance with traditional laws adjudicated by senior law bosses. Following national 
research on Indigenous decision-making and conflict resolution in the context of native 
title, Toni Bauman has observed that a community’s ability to effectively respond to 
internal disputes and enforce their decisions is a key ingredient for durable agreements.84
 
Athanasiou took a different view on the dynamic between the Steering Committee and 
the State. Whilst considering that the split between the negotiation team and the Steering 
Committee was advantageous in allowing focused engagement with the Steering 
Committee, the disadvantage was that almost all of the real negotiation occurred at a 
technical level with the negotiation team away from the Steering Committee. This then 
led to frustration and accusations of lack of respect from the Steering Committee when 
impasses referred from the negotiation team to the Steering Committee were not 
resolved. Athanasiou suggested a solution was a change of the relationship between the 
negotiation team and the Steering Committee – either an acknowledgement that the real 
                                                 
83 The State’s independent review of the process also highlights the critical role this traditionally based 
process played in the negotiations success. Ron Bogan and Stuart Hicks, Lessons Learned: An Evaluation 
of the Framework of the Negotiations for the Ord Final Agreement 2006, Office of Native Title, Perth, 
2006, p53. 
84 Toni Bauman, Final Report of the Indigenous Facilitation and Mediation Project July 2003-June 2006: 
research findings, recommendations and implementation, AIATSIS, Canberra, 2006. 
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negotiation occurs with the negotiation team away from the Steering Committee with 
unresolved issues being raised by the Committee as an issue to be reconsidered or 
allowing all negotiations to be conducted with the Steering Committee with assistance 
from the technical team. 
 
Adequate Preparation 
 
Participants identified that the need for adequate preparation prior to the commencement 
of formal negotiations was important to an effective negotiation process. 
 
Adequate preparation was identified as appropriate notice of the negotiation to ensure 
construction of an effective decision-making process, including what Cook described as a 
‘capacity audit’ of the resources of the Indigenous side to enable an effective response. 
Adequate preparation was also identified in terms of funding for research on the potential 
scope of the negotiation prior to the settling of documents such as framework agreements. 
Framework agreements are not merely procedural - they establish the scope of 
negotiation. A standard mechanism for such research is a social and economic impact 
assessment of a proposed development on the relevant community. As noted previously, 
after the Miriuwung and Gajerrong identified ‘fixing the past’ of Ord Stage 1 as a 
threshold issue for negotiations over Ord Stage 2, the State funded the Fix the Past: Move 
to the Future85 report which was pivotal in achieving a successful final agreement. 
However, the State then controversially chose not to undertake an Aboriginal social and 
economic impact assessment of the Ord Stage 2 developments, seen by the Miriuwung 
and Gajerrong team as a significant deficiency in generating standard information 
available in commercial negotiations. 
 
Consistent with the experiences of the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi team the Miriuwung 
and Gajerrong team noted that despite the State imposing highly demanding time frames, 
the State then misjudged their own timeframes and would routinely require the 
Miriuwung and Gajerrong team to get across extensive documents the night before a 
meeting. Such inadequate preparation by the State militates against informed consent, 
undermines good faith and creates barriers to timely resolution of agreements. 
 
Workshop participants observed that the MG-Ord funding process was a significant 
improvement on the fortnightly applications required during the Burrup negotiations. 
Budgets were agreed for long periods, although negotiations for these budgets were often 
pernickety and hampered by the State’s unrealistic negotiation timeframes. Roberts noted 
that there were also some inappropriate attempts to restrict the composition of the 
negotiation team and access to external expertise by limiting the budget, which if 
successful would have impacted upon the Miriuwung and Gajerrong’s adequate 
preparation. 
 
                                                 
85 Kahn, above n 47. 
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Wimmera Agreement 
 
The Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk peoples asserted that they 
had significant control over the decision-making process and timing of their 
negotiations.86 Traditional owners initially obtained funding to organise themselves as a 
community in response to inappropriate meetings imposed by their then native title 
representative body and State representatives. Jenny Beer (W) described that: 
 
We were required to make decisions on the day. This was not right. We 
decided to hold our own meetings to include all families. At the first 
meeting everyone walked away from the table. I organised a second 
meeting and asked everyone to commit to a native title process. They did 
and we then directed our counsel to do what we wanted … We changed 
the way things were done in Victoria. 
 
The traditional owners then approached their representative body and the State to assist 
them in making an agreement over their country. They resisted pressure from their legal 
adviser to litigate, resisted government pressure to have matters decided over 
inappropriately short time periods and sought substantive outcomes that would develop a 
skills base and assist the community to achieve self determination in the future. As Jenny 
Beer (W) stated: 
 
At the first meeting with the State they went into speed mode, have to do 
this, do that. We had to say to them ‘hold on, pull up, we don’t work so 
fast, don’t have the resources’ … We had to tell the State that we are not 
like a corporation where you go to talk to one representative. In 
Indigenous communities you have lots of people to talk to. 
 
Jenny Beer (W) further explained that the strength of their culturally appropriate 
decision-making process, based on traditional family groups, allowed the clans to deal 
with significant internal disputes, including in relation to authorisation. 
 
We became so strong as everyone owned the process. Short circuited the 
renegades in order to see the ILUA signed ... Tried to eliminate greed – any time 
money comes across the table it is for the whole community. 
 
This situation reflects the Miriuwung and Gajerrong’s experience with dissident 
claimants but highlights the fractious situation still faced by the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi. As with the Miriuwung and Gajerrong, the reinvigoration of culturally 
appropriate decision-making processes granted traditional owners a level of control over 
their community’s future. Jenny Beer (W) stated: 
 
We had forgotten how to communicate as a community. The claim and 
agreement focused back on our laws and customs … Our long term goal is 
                                                 
86 In terms of timeframes, this may primarily be because the Wimmera agreement was not triggered in 
response to future act notices. 
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to become self-sufficient. Welfare stuff is destroying our people. The 
agreement is about capacity building and partnerships, building the skills 
base. 
 
In response to a question at the workshop about whether rejeuvenation of the traditional 
owner’s identity through the positive recognition of native title and associated decision-
making rights were more important than money, Jenny Beer (W) replied: 
 
Yes. Culture is more important ... People are coming back after being 
dispersed from the missions. There is a growth in our identity. We can’t 
survive without our mob. 
 
Community reinvigoration simultaneously strengthened their negotiation position with 
other parties. Jenny Beer (W) explained that ‘once we got ourselves together we had 
people willing to help us.’  
 
At the local level there were people willing to come to the table, the Parks 
Department, the Department of Sustainability and Environment – they 
were on top of the Cultural Heritage Act but didn’t know the native title 
process… On a local level we achieved. The process has to start from the 
ground. That is where it will all be implemented. 
 
Caitlin described the community as ‘a binding force that had a positive influence on the 
State’s engagement’ as they were able to impress relevant players of their seriousness and 
ability to engage. Caitlin also noted that a key driver for the agreement was the Attorney-
General Rob Hulls MP, who had a strong commitment to land justice and broad based 
settlements of native title in Victoria. As many participants noted, this strength of the 
Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk peoples and the commitment of 
the Attorney-General resulted in an agreement and consent determination, which whilst 
limited, is the antithesis of the disastrous Yorta Yorta decisions,87 the first Victorian 
native title application.88
 
Complexity of Negotiating with Governments 
 
The Office of Native Title (WA) participants commented that a negative aspect of the 
Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and Miriuwung and Gajerrong negotiations from their 
perspective was that when impasses were reached, Indigenous parties occasionally 
stepped outside the negotiation framework and made direct approaches to Ministers. 
They commented that: 
 
                                                 
87 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria & Ors [1998] FCA 1606; Yorta Yorta  v 
Victoria  (2001) 110 FCR 244; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 
CLR 422; 194 ALR 538. 
88 Whilst the State committed to the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk Peoples 
agreement a few months shy of the High Court Yorta Yorta decision, all other parties including the 
Commonwealth signed on afterwards. 
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The politics is at the first stage when flushing out threshold issues and 
agreeing on the scope of negotiations. Reintroducing politicisation after 
this stage is counter-productive. 
 
Conversely, the Indigenous teams considered political lobbying of senior politicians as a 
productive step and that in the Miriuwung and Gajerrong and Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi 
negotiations this step was taken after discussion with the State’s lead negotiator. Dodson 
commented that unlike negotiations with corporate interests where everything is on the 
table for discussion, negotiations with the State are unique in that they are generally 
subject to a pre-determined Cabinet position. This locks in the scope of discussions and 
provides Indigenous parties little room to move, a situation Dodson described as ‘a 
serious flaw in the negotiation structure’. He considered judicious approaches to 
Ministers on contested issues were the only option for responding to this flaw and that 
such approaches legitimately politicised (not repoliticised) issues not previously subject 
to negotiation. Roberts similarly noted that it is critical to deal with impasses on key 
issues as they arise otherwise the quality and success of the negotiations may be 
compromised. He cited the example of the Miriuwung and Gajerrrong demand that the 
State respond to the impacts of Ord Stage 1 before they would agree to negotiate Ord 
Stage 2, a position eventually acknowledged by the State and which facilitated the MG-
Ord Agreement. Athanasiou agreed these political approaches were important 
acknowledgments that, at crossroads in the negotiations, the State negotiating team is the 
messenger and not the ultimate decision-makers. Flexibility to allow for such approaches 
was a sign of respect for the negotiation process.  
Implementation 
The nexus between culturally appropriate decision-making processes, community 
development and the durability of an agreement was again revealed in the different 
strategies taken to implementation. To ensure an agreement’s success, all Indigenous 
participants and other experts identified as essential that implementation be controlled by 
traditional owners (and where relevant their native title representative bodies) with 
appropriate support from the State. Caitlin also identified the importance of ensuring 
implementation occur expeditiously because: 
 
agreements do rust if not put into place quickly enough. Personalities 
change and corporate knowledge is lost. 
 
Burrup Agreement 
 
Preparation for the Canberra workshop led to a review of the Burrup Agreement files by 
both the Pilbara Native Title Service and the State. These reviews revealed that 
implementation of the Burrup Agreement had fallen off the agenda. 
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The main vehicle for implementation of the Burrup Agreement was the Approved Body 
Corporate (ABC).89 The State agreed to provide $150,000 for an independent consultant 
(nominated by the State after consultation with the parties) to incorporate the ABC. Little 
detail was included in the Agreement as to how the ABC would be structured.  
 
It took the State nine months to determine the tender for the consultant and a further three 
and a half years for the consultant to establish the ABC. At the workshop, the Ngarluma 
and Yindjibarndi team commented that this delay was primarily due to the consultant’s 
unfamiliarity with the fractious history and cultural processes of the three Indigenous 
parties. The delay left the community in abeyance with the threat of internal breakdown. 
It was strongly argued that a far more effective process would have occurred if the native 
title representative body had responsibility for implementation. 
 
A representative from the Office of Native Title (WA) agreed that establishment of the 
corporation was too slow and that their preference would also have been for the 
representative body to have responsibility for implementation however, as explained by 
Athanasiou, this was not considered possible in the circumstances: 
 
If the Pilbara Native Title Service was going to be the body to put together 
the corporation and implement the agreement, then the State would not 
have got the Wong-Goo-To-Oo to sign.  
 
Criticism was directed at the State for privileging the formal legal success of all native 
title parties signing the agreement over what would have been a more rapid incorporation 
if managed by the representative body. In reply to this criticsim, Athanasiou explained 
that because of the urgent timeframes the State ‘didn’t want to go to arbitration. Rather, 
the State desperately wanted to get agreement [with all native title parties] and go to the 
next phase’ and that appointment of an independent consultant was viewed as an 
appropriate option in these circumstances. However the State did eventually go to 
arbitration because of the tactics of the Wong-Goo-To-Oo (discussed below). In these 
circumstances, participants commented that reverting to a more robust implementation 
process controlled by traditional owners, rather than continue with a flawed 
implementation model to attract the Wong-Goo-To-Oo, was an appropriate option. 
 
On 19th April 2006, the Murujuga Aboriginal Corporation was finally incorporated and 
on 31 July 2006 the first financial benefits from the Burrup Agreement, approximately $4 
million, were transferred to the Corporation,90 five years after the Ngarulma and 
Yindjibarndi had consented to the State’s proposal. The corporate structure is as follows: 
Wong-goo-tt-oo four places, Yaburara two places, Mardudunhera two places, Yinjibarndi 
two places and Ngarluma two places. The chairman and treasurer are Wong-goo-tt-oo 
                                                 
89 Clause 17, although some benefits were to flow through an independent Employment Service Provider – 
see clauses 15 and 16. 
90 Office of Native Title (WA), Factsheet, Burrup and Maitland Industrial Estates Agreement, Burrup and 
Maitland, Agreements,  Department of the Premier and Cabinet, viewed 29 April 2009,  
<http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Agreements/Land_Use_Agreements/FACT_SHEET_BU
RRUP_AND_MAITLAND_INDUST…(1).pdf>. 
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members and the secretary is Yaburara. This result is curious given the Federal Court 
determination that the Ngarluma and Yindibarndi are the traditional owners for the area, 
and that the Wong-goo-tt-oo and Yaburara and Mardudunhera are part of this traditional 
owner group, not separate entities. This corporate structure has since been questioned by 
Ngarluma and Yindibarndi representatives as lacking informed consent.91
 
Implementation of other key aspects of the Burrup agreement that were not discussed at 
the workshop are as follows. 
 
• The management plan over the Burrup freehold remains incomplete. The Ngarda-
ngarli Advisory Group was established in July 2004 to assist a consultant to draft 
the management plan and the Draft Management Plan for the Burrup 
Conservation Reserve was released for public comment on 11 July 2006.92 The 
Department of Environment and Conservation (WA) website states that the 
Management Plan is yet to be finalised.93  
 
• No participants were aware of the outcomes of the Roebourne Enhancement 
Scheme. A web search reveals that the Roebourne Enhancement Government 
Agency Committee first met in November 2001 and was wound up after the 
scheduled four year term. Curiously, the documents listed on the website (which 
include two media releases from Premier Gallop and Premier Carpenter94 and 
departmental reports) make no mention of the links between the Scheme and the 
Burrup negotiations or indeed any Indigenous specific concerns. For example, the 
Pilbara Development Commission site states that the: 
 
Roebourne Enhancement Scheme (RES) was established by the 
State Government with the aim of improving community 
infrastructure and the coordination of services to Roebourne 
residents. The State Government allocated a total of $3.5 million to 
the project which was managed through the Pilbara Development 
Commission in partnership with the Shire of Roebourne and the 
Roebourne Community.95
 
Scheme projects included redevelopment of streets, tidy town programs and ‘bush 
tucker’ interpretative signs. The Department of Housing and Works also 
undertook a $1m program to remove asbestos from contaminated sites and a $1m 
program to upgrade public housing. 
                                                 
91 ‘Burrup Boom a Bonanaza for Some’, The West Australian 11 August 2007. 
92 Above n 90. 
93 Department of Environment and Conservation, Burrup Peninsula Conservation Reserve, Land 
Management Planning, Management and Protection, Western Australian Department of Environment and 
Conservation, viewed 29 April 2009, <www.dec.wa.gov.au/management-and-protection/land-management-
planning/burrup-peninsula-conservation-reserve-management-plan.html>. 
94 Government Media Office, Mediastatements, Government of Western Australia, viewed 29 April 2009, 
<www.mediastatements.wa.gov.au/ArchivedStatements/Pages/CarpenterLaborGovernmentSearch.aspx>. 
95 Pilbara Development Commission, Roebourne Enhancement Scheme, Funding Schemes, viewed 29 April 
2009, <www.pdc.wa.gov.au/funding--schemes/roebourne-enhancement-scheme.aspx>. 
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• In 2008, over five years after execution of the Burrup agreement, 
Pilbara Joblink was appointed as the Employment Service Provider. 
 
• Periodic monitoring of the effect of industrial emissions on rock art commenced 
in 2004. 
 
Athanasiou acknowledged at the workshop that implementation was the biggest lesson 
learnt from the Burrup Agreement. 
 
MG-Ord Agreement 
 
The approach taken to implementation of the the MG-Ord Agreement was significantly 
better. 
 
MG Corporate Structures 
 
The MG-Ord Agreement provides funding from the State to the Kimberley Land Council 
to develop the MG Corporation and various subsidiary trusts post execution of the 
Agreement. However, prior to execution the Miriuwung and Gajerrong team advocated 
that it was more efficient to undertake the intensive work required to develop the 
corporate structures during the negotiations. Such an approach was efficient as it took 
advantage of the momentum generated by the negotiations, the expertise of the Steering 
Committee and negotiation team in dealing with the community and the ready availability 
of the State to hammer out any concerns. The Miriuwung and Gajerrong team saw these 
as the most likely conditions to achieve focused and careful debate on a range of 
corporate structures. 
 
Whilst the State initially resisted expending implementation funds during the 
negotiations, the proposal was eventually supported. Consequently, the final MG-Ord 
Agreement sets out detailed structures and responsibilities for the MG Corporation 
(including its role as formally assisting the Miriuwung and Gajerrong prescribed bodies 
corporate) and the various subsidiary trusts. As the Steering Committee and broader 
community were required to participate directly in and take ownership of corporate 
development as an integral part of their negotiations, this strategy also continued to 
entrench the principle of Miriuwung and Gajerrong capacity building as a goal of the 
negotiations. 
 
As a clear indicator of the success of this approach, the Yawoorroong 
Miriuwung Gajerrong Yirrgeb Noong Dawang Aboriginal Corporation (‘MG 
Corporation’) was incorporated on 2 February 2006 less than five months after the 
signing of the Agreement. Consistent with the negotiations, the MG Corporation 
embraces a culturally appropriate decision-making process: the 32 member Governing 
Committee is comprised of two representatives from each of the 16 dawang (traditional 
land holding areas) that comprise the land subject to the Agreement. In August 2008, the 
MG Corporation received the Highly Commended award in the category of Best 
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Governance for an Aborginal organisation at the National Australian Indigenous 
Governance Awards.96  
 
Whilst efficient development of corporate structures was an important success of the 
negotiations, a consequential issue arose in terms of funding development of the 
remaining corporate structures. The Agreement included a milestone called the 
‘Satisfaction Date’ at which time the majority of the benefits under the Agreement would 
flow from the State to the MG Corporation. The ‘Satisfaction Date’ was the date at which 
all remaining corproate structures had been developed to the satisfaction of the State. 
However, two thirds of the implementation money under the agreement was spent 
developing the MG corporate structures during the negotiations, leaving insufficient 
funds to finalise outstanding matters required to reach the Satisfaction Date. As the State 
did not release sufficient additional funds, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong were required to 
spend around 65% of its ‘post-Satisfaction Date’ implementation budget to reach the 
Satisfaction Date, necessarily leaving a significant shortfall for other aspects of 
implementation. Desmond Hill (MG) argued that it should be the State’s responsibility to 
fund any agreement to the stage where benefits accrue. A 2007 report97 commissioned by 
the MG Corporation found that the corporation was unable to implement its post 
Satisfaction Date responsibilities under the Agreement without further implementation 
funding, a situation that put the new MG Corporation at significant risk. The State has 
since provided additional funding. 
 
A conclusion from this situation is that priority be given to realistic implementation 
budgets in comprehensive agreements and that flexibility as to agreed budgets be a 
priority to ensure agreements do not fall over before they have barely begun.  
 
MG Prescribed Bodies Corporate 
 
A novel mechanism for implementation in the MG-Ord Agreement was the creative 
approach to developing an operative prescribed body corporate (PBC) for MG#1 (and the 
later PBC for MG#4). 
 
The unproductive stoush between the Commonwealth and the State as to who should 
fund PBCs is well documented and has been subject to negative judicial comment, 
including by Justice North during the Full Court’s sitting in Kununurra for the MG#1 
consent determination.98 Acknowledging (whilst not accepting) the stasis in government 
policy on this critical issue, the Miriuwung and Gajerrong decided that the resourced MG 
Corporation be effectively utilised to undertake PBC work. The executive of the MG#1 
                                                 
96 The awards were created by Reconciliation Australia and BHP Billiton to identify, celebrate and promote 
strong leadership, effective partnerships and creative thinking in Indigenous organisations. 
97 Professor Kathy Alexander,  ‘Organisational Review of the Yawoorroong Miriuwung Gajerrong 
Corporation (MG Corporation)’ April 2007. 
98Unreported. Justice North formally made comment on the issue in the Karajarri #2 consent determination: 
‘It would be an absurd outcome if, after the expenditure of such large sums to reach a determination of 
native title, the proper utilisation of the land was hampered because of lack of a relatively small 
expenditure for the administration of the PBC.’ Nangkiriny v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 1156. 
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PBC and the MG Corporation is deliberately identical and the PBC rules explicitly 
recognise the right to delegate to the MG Corporation all their administrative functions. 
Final execution of future act matters required to be undertaken by the PBC can therefore 
be done during an MG Corporation meeting by the executives ‘changing hats’ and 
operating as the PBC executive. This process not only ensures that the PBC has de facto 
funding but efficiently utilises the Miriuwung and Gajerrong’s meeting time. 
 
This creative and practical response to the fraught issue of PBC funding is another benefit 
of focused, comprehensive negotiations. As Dodson commented at the workshop: 
 
If we argue about who is going to pay for the PBC, States or Commonwealth, the 
issue is never going to be resolved. I hope that the States and Commonwealth can 
see the beneficial good that results from the Ord negotiations, can see the 
seamless move from negotiation to implementation and realise that the timely 
establishment of a functioning PBC is a benefit to both levels of government. 
 
Update on Implementation of Other Benefits 
 
• Initial Benefits at Satisfaction Date: in July 2006 initial benefits of money and 
land valued at over $7 million was transferred to the MG Corporation and the MG 
Charitable Trust.99 
 
• Ord Enhancement Scheme: in mid-2006 the Ord Enhancement Scheme 
commenced and early priorities identified by the OES Committee are: renal health 
and health education; education; early childhood learning and family support; 
youth at risk; cultural maintenance; housing, infrastructure, training and 
employment.100 
 
• New conservation reserves: whilst the six new conservation reserves to be jointly 
managed by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong and the Department of Environment 
and Conservation have yet to be created, important steps have been taken towards 
this aspect of the MG-Ord agreement. In 2006, the Yoorrooyang Dawang 
Regional Park Council (‘Park Council’) was established to facilitate a Parks 
Management Plan for the conservation areas, to develop local Indigenous training 
and employment opportunities and to enable on-going management of the 
Conservation Parks.101 In 2008, an extensive report entitled Miriuwung and 
Gajerrong Peoples’ Guidelines for Developing Management Plans for 
Conservation Parks and Nature Reserves under the Ord Final Agreement was 
presented to the Department of Environment and Conservation by the Park 
                                                 
99 Office of Native Title (WA), Milestone, Overview, Ord Final Agreement,  Ord Final, Agreements, 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, viewed 29 April 2009, 
http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/agreements_OrdFinal.aspx.> 
100 Above n 51. 
101 Department of Environment and Conservation, Yoorrooyang Dawang Regional Park Council, Land, 
Management and Planning, Management and Protection, WA Department of Environment and 
Conservation, viewed 29 April 2009,  <www.dec.wa.gov.au/management-and-protection/land-
management-planning/yoorrooyang-dawang-regional-park-council.html> 
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Council. 102 On 31 March 2009, Consolidated Pastoral Company relinquished 
almost 200,000 hectares of its pastoral lease, the bulk of which will be utilised for 
the new conservation parks.103 However, advice from the MG Corporation is that 
progress on the parks have now hit a legislative roadblock as the commitments 
made by the State in the MG Agreement in terms of joint management cannot be 
met under currrent legislation. 
 
• Reserve 31165: on 26 October 2006 the Water and Rivers Commission entered 
into an agreement with the MG Corporation for the joint management of Reserve 
31165. The Reserve covers approximately 127,000 hectares of land at the 
southern end of Lake Argyle.104 
 
• Freehold grant over Yardungarrl: 31 August 2007 the State granted freehold over 
50,000 hectares (known as Yardungarrl) to the MG Corporation to be managed 
for the specific dawang (traditional land holding groups) of Yardungarrl.105 
 
• 5% of Kununurra Residential Lots: in April 2008 Landcorp released 35 lots in 
Stage 3 of Lakeside Park Estate. MG Corporation received 5% of the sale 
price.106 
 
Wimmera Agreement 
 
With the assistance of Native Title Services Victoria, the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, 
Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk peoples established the Barengi Gadjin Land Council 
Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC in early 2005 (prior to their consent determination and 
execution of their ILUA). The Barengi Gadjin Land Council is the prescribed body 
corporate (PBC) for the positive determination of native title under the consent 
determination and the body responsible for receiving and implementing the benefits of 
the ILUA (including the holding of freehold, holding of financial benefits and 
representative function on behalf of traditional owners). The ILUA provides operational 
funding for the PBC and three full time positions. 
 
Jenny Beer (W) states that the momentum and focus of the negotiation process, and the 
re-invigoration of their identity as traditional owners, ensured the PBC reflected a 
culturally appropriate governance model, based on family group representatives.  
 
[We] put our laws and customs into our corporation. This was not easy. 
We did lots of role plays to see how it might work. 
 
Since the workshop, a website search indicates that the Barengi Gadjin Land Council has 
been involved in a range of local development issues including cultural heritage 
                                                 
102 Above n 101. 
103 Above n 99. 
104 Above n 99. 
105 Above n 99. 
106 Above n 99. 
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discussions and a formal agreement in relation to the Wimmera Mallee Pipeline 
Project.107 In November 2007 the Corporation was recognised as as Registered 
Aboriginal Party under the new Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006, granting them a 
legal role in relation to protection of their cultural heritage. Several times during the 
workshop, Jenny Beer (W) noted the destructive effect of the former Victorian heritage 
legislation as the legislation empowers individuals who are not necessarily traditional 
owners to agree to disturb cultural sites. Acceptance of the Wotjobaluk, Jaadwa, 
Jadawadjali, Wergaia and Jupagalk peoples right to speak in relation to cultural heritage 
issues under the new legislation is a significant flow-on effect of their recognition as as 
traditional owners. 
 
In a similar move to the MG Corporation, the Barengi Gadjin Land Council also 
commissioned an independent assessment of organisational capacity in 2008. Reflecting 
the findings of the MG Corporation review, the assessment identified that the 
organisation lacks the capacity to implement the Agreement, establish appropriate 
governance systems, attract appropriate staff and respond to intra-Indigenous disputes, 
including for the reason of insufficient and uncertain funding.108 As noted above, it is 
critical that realistic implementation budgets are provided to these Indigenous 
corporations to ensure that such hard fought for agreements do not fall over before they 
have barely begun.  
Capacity of Governments to Undertake Comprehensive Settlements 
Commitment to Comprehensive Settlements 
 
Many in the workshop identified that capacity building for comprehensive settlements 
was not only required for Indigenous parties but also for governments, as a lack of 
government capacity had hampered all three negotiations. By way of benchmarking 
outcomes, workshop participants on the first day identified specific issues they 
considered governments needed to address. These included: 
 
• comprehensive settlement policy frameworks; 
• appropriate funding arrangements; 
• skilled negotiators; 
• legal capacity to provide certain specific outcomes such as inalienable freehold to 
accommodate communal ownership;109 
• standard inclusion in agreements of native title group succession post 
determination and review provisions following more successful native title 
settlements;110 
                                                 
107 GWM Water, Piping It Factsheet, GWM Water, viewed 29 April 2009, 
<www.pipingit.com.au/pdfs/factsheets/Construction.pdf>. 
108 Sandy Hodge, Executive Officer of Barengi Gadjin Aboriginal Land Council RNTBC, during a public 
discussion at the 2009 AIATSIS Native Title Conference. 
109 WA does not have a model for inalienable freehold. For the Miriuwung and Gajerrong to obtain a 
commensurable grant of tenure required a tortuous legal process. To then ensure that communities located 
within that freehold had access to basic development grants required leases from sub-trusts. 
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• amendments that aligned State heritage laws with native title.111 
 
However, this aspect of the workshop foundered as representatives from the WA and 
NSW governments indicated that a model of comprehensive native title settlements was 
not consistent with their native title policy. The South Australian representative explained 
that their native title office focused on ILUAs by not funding parties who have filed 
native title claims against it, but did not expand on whether such ILUAs were broad 
based in nature. Commonwealth participants noted that they saw potential in 
comprehensive settlements but did not elaborate. 
 
As previously noted no Victorian Government representative attended the 2006 workshop 
due to a policy review of native title settlements, however in pre-workshop discussions 
Victorian Government representatives expressed concern at the minimalist benefits in the 
Wimmera Agreement. In June 2009, Attorney General Rob Hulls MP announced the new 
Victorian Native Title Settlement Framework, which seeks to comprehensively settle 
traditional owners’ concerns outside of a legal framework and which reflects many of 
benchmarks identifed by traditional owners in the workshop. 
 
Comprehensive Settlements are Outside State Budgets 
 
The absence of a clear commitment to agreements akin to comprehensive settlements by 
the State governments in attendance generated significant discussion. Whilst 
representatives of the Office of Native Title (WA) identified that a major issue learnt 
from the Burrup and MG-Ord negotiations was the benefit of a ‘whole of government 
approach’, the tag ‘comprehensive agreements’ for either agreement was rejected. 
Instead, the Office of Native Title (WA) emphatically characterised these agreements as 
unique, isolated responses to specific future acts in relation to strategic land use needs. 
They advised that the two agreements were not precedent setting in terms of a policy 
approach to native title and that any further such negotiations would only arise in limited, 
if any, circumstances.112  
 
By way of explanation, the Office of Native Title (WA) emphasised its work is focused 
on ‘consent determinations’ not future act negotiations. They advised that the policy basis 
for this position is that they are not funded to undertake future act negotiations, which are 
predominantly administered by the Department of Industry and Resources, and hence in 
                                                                                                                                                 
110 Desmond Hill raised the possibility of reviewing the Roebourne Enhancement Scheme in light of the 
more far reaching approach in the Ord Enhancement Scheme, a proposal supported by Patrick Dodson from 
a public policy perspective of equitable accountability mechanisms for State departments. Lisa Strelein 
noted that in New Zealand there is a clause in land settlements that groups can revisit an agreement if better 
agreements have been made. 
111 Helen Lawrence and Jenny Beer noted the destructive impact of State heritage laws on traditional 
owners’ native title rights, because (due to the timing of their enactment) they fail to reflect the inextricable 
relationship between traditional laws and customs and cultural heritage. 
112 It was noted that the negotiations with the Yawuru native title holders of Broome may reflect the 
approach taken in the MG-Ord Agreement. The Office of Native Title (WA) is seeking to implement an 
‘alternative settlement’ process, however this process does not propose to include recognition of native 
title.  See Office of Native Title (WA), Alternative settlements, viewed 29 April 2009, 
<http://www.nativetitle.wa.gov.au/Alternative_Settlements.aspx>. 
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the context of current budget allocations such negotiations are ‘too expensive’. 
Representatives from the NSW Government’s native title office noted that their funding 
and administrative arrangements also require they take this approach. The Office of 
Native Title (WA) further noted that the Commonwealth and not the State was 
responsible for funding native title representative bodies to negotiate future acts, a 
position reminiscent of the PBC funding debate and one which triggered Dodson to ask: 
 
Is there an erudite point between consent determinations and future acts? 
The State issues future acts to get an outcome. I don’t see how a policy 
position that the Commonwealth funds NTRBs is relevant. The State is 
advancing future acts for the State’s purposes. The State is wishing to get 
use of land for itself or for corporate interests. 
 
In light of the Office of Native Title (WA) comments on financial constraints, 
participants sought their views of the nexus between access to adequate funding and 
culturally appropriate, informed decision-making processes. The Office of Native Title 
(WA) observed that: 
 
having very strong Indigenous decision-making is central and clearly 
needed. But it is very expensive to structure negotiations in this way. It is 
unsustainable for a state government to continue to fund negotiations at 
that level ad infinitum into the future. 
 
Athanasiou further explained that: 
 
Everyone is in furious agreement about the nexus between adequate 
funding of traditional owners and appropriate decision-making which will 
be durable and make agreements work. What WA is saying is that the 
Commonwealth is supposed to fund future acts. I don’t think the states are 
saying you should clamp down on the quality of negotiations, but that the 
States cannot fund it. The States are currently supplementing where the 
Commonwealth is not allocating funds. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Comprehensive Settlements for Governments 
 
Participants sought to unpack the concept of ‘too expensive’ within the context of 
comprehensive native title settlements. If ‘too expensive’ meant that governments were 
required to go outside their allocated budget to receive additional funding for 
comprehensive settlements, then the real issue was that governments were currently 
constrained by their mandate and budgeting frameworks. Roberts noted that these 
impediments could be fixed with political will and suggested that such political will 
should be based upon a cost-benefit analysis of comprehensive native title settlements.  
 
For example, the Office of Native Title (WA) advised that the projected regional 
economic and social stability to be achieved through the Burrup and MG-Ord 
negotiations created significant government impetus to reach these agreements. 
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• In the Burrup Agreement, the State facilitated the native title negotiations to avoid 
the uncontrolled situation of multiple proponents negotiating with multiple 
registered native title groups, a situation not in the public interest for crucial 
economic development nor in the interest of maximising traditional owner 
outcomes. 
 
• In the MG-Ord Agreement, the key policy driver was the government 
commitment to expand the Ord irrigation scheme. Although concerns were held 
about the level of commercial viability of Ord Stage 2, the State considered the 
regional economics of the East Kimberley would go backwards unless large scale 
commercial developments proceeded. A negative East Kimberley economy would 
create significant social and economic dislocation to which the State would 
eventually have to respond. 
 
The Burrup and MG-Ord Agreements also ensured that the State benefited from the 
certainty that compensation was settled for all agreement-related future acts, and further 
in relation to the MG#1 determination and MG#4 claim,  certainty that compensation was 
settled for any extinguishment of native title. In the Wimmera Agreement, certainty for 
the State could not have been more complete with the Agreement settling past 
extinguishment of native title and all future ‘future act’ extinguishment of native title. 
 
For traditional owners, the tangible benefits delivered through comprehensive settlements 
with the State are of a different nature to benefits from developer driven future act 
negotiations because of the nature and capacity of the State. Grants of tenure, income 
streams from a range of developments, joint management of conservation parks, the 
promising Ord Enhancement Scheme and rights to comment on developments outside the 
future act regime (as in the Wimmera ILUA) are all benefits only deliverable by the State.  
 
The intangible benefits of an appropriately funded, comprehensive process are the 
strengthening of culturally appropriate governance structures and Indigenous capacity 
building.  
 
This analysis of the overall advantages and disadvantages of comprehensive native title 
settlements avoids what some participants described as a disingenuous cost shifting from 
States to the Commonwealth for its own future act negotiations. Professor Ciaran 
O’Fairchellaigh stated it was timely for States to recognise that native title agreements 
were part of core business and include a standard agreement budget line in their 
budgetary process, which could be varied as appropriate. Otherwise, States place 
themselves in the curious position of discounting the significant possibilities of 
comprehensive native title settlements merely because they do not fit into the current 
budget process of one departmental office. In support of this proposal, Professor Marcia 
Langton noted that most mining companies now include such a budget line as part of 
their forward planning strategy, reflecting the reality of mining business in Australia. 
Taking account of the views of the State governments, it may also be appropriate for the 
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Commonwealth to commit to bipartisan funding arrangements with State governments 
for future comprehensive agreements.113
 
Enforcing the Integrity of Negotiations 
 
A final issue raised at the workshop by way of benchmarking effective processes during 
native title negotiations was the importance of all parties enforcing the integrity of the 
negotiations. This issue arises because part of the political context of communal native 
title negotiations is that some traditional owners, lawyers and anthropologists will exploit 
the native title system to lever economic and political gain for small groups of 
individuals. Whilst spoilers can a play a role in any negotiation, the nature of native title 
negotiations with a community (often a community not yet recognised by a court) makes 
such negotiations more susceptible to internal division. Political organisations or media 
antipathetic to native title can use these breakaway individuals to advance a particular 
agenda.  
 
All Indigenous participants experienced spoiler behaviour during negotiation of their 
agreements. They observed that how the State and other institutional participants (such as 
the NNTT) respond to this behaviour is critical to the coherence and integrity of 
negotiations. They stated that whilst they expected the State and the NNTT to respect 
legal rights, it was crucial that the real politic of the situation was meaningfully 
acknowledged rather than an agreement sought at whatever cost. 
 
The most fraught example of spoiling was during the Burrup negotiations. The NTA 
required the State to enter into good faith negotiations with the three registered native 
title parties - the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi, the Yaburara Mardudhunera and the Wong-
Goo-To-Oo. However, the NTA does not require that the State reach an agreement with 
all parties – any negotiating party can apply to the NNTT for an arbitral determination 
that an act can be done if no agreement has been reached 6 months after a future act has 
been notified.114 Almost without exception, such applications are granted. Whilst this 
mechanism is generally used against the interests of native title parties, it is also a useful 
tool for the State for short-circuiting disingenuous and destructive native title parties. 
 
The State initially advised the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi they required sign off from all 
three native title parties on a single agreement. Positively, the Yaburara Mardudhunera 
quickly folded into the negotiation process established between the Ngarluma and 
Yindjibarndi and the State. However, the Wong-Goo-To-Oo made it clear they would not 
participate in a unified negotiation. In recognition of this, the State changed tactic and 
required only two out of three of the native title parties to sign the agreement. 
 
After the State had struck an agreement with Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and Yaburara 
Mardudhunera groups, they applied to the NNTT for a determination that the future acts 
be granted if agreement could not be reached because two members of the Ngarluma and 
                                                 
113 This appears to be the approach pursued by the Victorian Government in their groundbreaking Native 
Title Alternative Settlement Framwork. 
114  s 35 NTA. 
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Yindjibarndi and Yaburara Mardudhunera applicant groups did not consent.115 In good 
faith, the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and Yaburara and Mardudhunera did not actively 
contest the State’s application.116 However, the Wong-Goo-To-Oo did contest the 
application on the basis that the State had not negotiated with them in good faith. The 
matter went to extended NNTT arbitration which Flanagan notes became: 
 
an elaborate and high profile affair involving public submissions and weeks 
of evidence from claimants, environmental experts, rock art experts, 
proponent company representatives, senior government bureaucrats and a 
number of days of site visits on country. Counsel for the Wong-Goo-Tt-Oo, 
Ian Viner QC, vigorously cross examined senior government bureaucrats and 
others who had been instrumental in facilitating the industrial development. 
 
Mediation was also intensively pursued by the NNTT.  One day before the arbitrated 
decision was to be handed down, the Wong-Goo-To-Oo decided to sign the agreement 
negotiated with the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi and Yaburara and Mardudhunera with 
certain amendments achieved through the NNTT mediation process. Flanagan comments 
that: 
 
It transpired that, during the course of the arbitration, [the Wong-Goo-Tt-Oo] 
had been secretly negotiating with two proponent companies and had 
managed to broker two agreements that provided for exclusive benefits to go 
to the Wong-Goo-Tt-Oo group only. 
 
At the workshop, State participants advised that they were aware of these side discussions 
but had unsuccessfully sought to rein them in. Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi team members 
directed criticism at the State for not immediately disclosing these discussions to them 
during the negotiations in the context of good faith. 
 
At the workshop, the perspective of both sides of the Burrup Agreement was that the 
Wong-Goo-To-Oo utilised its status as a registered native title party to create time and 
pressure to pursue side deals as well as achieve amendments to the final agreement. In 
lights of these tactics, the Ngarluma and Yindjibarndi team stated that the role of the 
NNTT in intensively mediating with the Wong-Goo-To-Oo and the State’s decision to 
allow the Wong-Goo-To-Oo to enter the agreement were highly unjust. As Strelein 
commented at the workshop: 
 
It appears that the end result of both the NNTT and the State in pursuing 
inclusion of the Wong-Goo-To-Oo is that the Burrup Agreement breathes 
continuing life to a bitter dispute. 
 
                                                 
115  The two members of the applicants groups were later removed from that position following successful 
applications to the Federal Court. Above n 78.  
116 Flanagan, above n 42, p.18. 
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This bitter dispute continues and is undermining durable implementation of the Burrup 
Agreement and any sense that the Ngarluma and Yindibarndi as the recognised native 
title holders have achieved a level of justice through the Agreement.117
 
In relation to the Wimmera Agreement, Jenny Beer (W) also voiced frustration that it 
took over two years after the State and Commonwealth had given in-principle agreement 
for the NNTT to mediate with minor respondents (beekeepers, fishers, farmers, mining 
interests). This delay was seen by some participants as unnecessary trepidation by the 
NNTT to take a harder line with these respondents, especially given their interests will 
always prevail over native title rights. In some circumstances, such a delay could threaten 
the coherence of the native title group and/or a final agreement. 
Conclusions 
Indigenous peoples have always understood that the real potential of Mabo’s recognition 
of prior sovereignty is the transformation of their relationship with governments from one 
of supplication to one of partnership, working together to take down the myriad of legal, 
social, governance and economic brick walls that have trapped so many into a life of 
bleak, unremitting hardship.  
 
This understanding is not merely the refined theoretical perspective of an Indigenous 
elite. It is the clear perspective of the traditional owners who attended the workshop, in 
some instances to the exclusion of any other comment. From personal experience, it is the 
consistently repeated perspective of every native title group I have worked with in the 
Kimberley over the past decade. 
 
The resistance to comprehensive native title settlements for the past sixteen years has not 
been from Indigenous people. It has been at a political level. The fact that the Rudd 
Government so early in its term rhetorically matched the Indigenous perspective is a sign 
of its genuine grasp of Australian Indigenous affairs. But as the Commonwealth 
Government has underlined, achieving this new partnership takes hard work from all 
participants, with a premium on respect, cooperation, mutual responsibility and a 
stringent evidence-based approach. 
 
The evidence of the two decade Harvard Project on sustainable Indigenous economies 
tells us that what is successful is a ‘nation building model’ in which culturally appropriate 
Indigenous governing institutions are a central aspect of development. This model 
develops communities rather than merely facilitating the economic interests of others. 
The rather more modest research for this paper tells us the same thing. A nation building 
model whilst not a ‘new solution’ internationally, is a new approach for Australian 
governments to come to terms with the enduringly shameful Indigenous situation. 
Significantly, the Commonwealth Government’s current research into native title 
payments from resource agreements identifies Indigenous governance, partnerships, 
                                                 
117 Above n 91 and public comments by Mr Stephen Dhu, CEO of the  Ngarluma Aboriginal Corporation,  
at the AIATSIS Native Title Conference 2009. 
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sustainable development and community and intergenerational wealth creation as primary 
factors in a new Indigenous economic strategy.118  
 
The hard work is, of course, to figure out how to make such agreed concepts practically 
operative and not simply rhetorical triumphs. The experiences of participants in the 
Burrup, MG-Ord and Wimmera agreements provide some benchmarks for procedural and 
substantive matters including the following. 
 
Procedural Benchmarks 
 
• The nexus between adequately funded, culturally appropriate Indigenous 
governance structures, adequate time frames and durable agreements. 
• Adequate and funded preparation time. 
• Direct interaction with senior members of relevant governments where required. 
• Adequately funded and Indigenous controlled implementation mechanisms. 
• A united negotiation front against spoiler elements. 
 
Substantive Benchmarks 
 
• Commitment to the non-discriminatory recognition of native title as a valuable 
property right, not merely a burdensome statutory procedure. 
• Non-discriminatory ‘exchanges’ of native title for other tenures or benefits. 
• The creative Ord Enhancements Scheme as a model for regional approaches to 
specific forms of social and economic disadvantage. 
• Review of all cultural heritage legislation to ensure traditional owners are the 
primary participants in such processes.  
• Standard agreement terms that benefits be revisited if better agreements made 
within the same jurisdiction and post-determination succession of agreements to a 
party recognised as holding native title in relevant circumstances. 
 
But perhaps the really hard work is coming to grips with the critical question of at what 
level should negotiations for comprehensive settlements commence? A ‘whole of 
government’ approach (housing, health, employment, training) cannot be efficiently 
responded to on a claim by claim basis without significant limitations and duplication. In 
light of these limitations, regional agreements have been identified over many years as 
the appropriate level for comprehensive settlements.119 For example, Indigenous leaders 
in the Kimberley have persistently advocated that the most efficient way forward is for 
the political footprint of native title to be the foundation of a regional approach to 
economic development and service delivery, driven by a culturally appropriate 
governance structure.120 Whilst this approach to comprehensive native title settlements 
                                                 
118 Above n 13. 
119 See for examples Patrick Sullivan, ‘Regional Agreements in Australia: An Overview Paper’, Lands, 
Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, no. 17, 1997; Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Process, Politics and Regional 
Agreements’, Lands, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Regional Agreements paper no.5, 1998; Yu, 
above n 22. 
120 Yu, above n 22. 
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can be expected to raise a political pulse, it is intuitive that a regional model will be more 
efficient than comprehensive-style settlements at a claim level triggered either by large 
future acts or by virtue of the incremental settlement of all native title claims.  
 
This is an embrace of the possibility of new solutions to enduring problems where old 
approaches have failed. As Yu wryly commented almost eight years ago in advocating 
for such an approach: 
  
People are not interested in incremental change whereby service programs can be 
rationalized and combined with State services to achieve a more effective delivery 
service. They want to re-write history. Not simply add to the chaos of what 
already exists.121  
 
This is the legacy that the Mabo decision deserves. 
 
                                                 
121 Yu, above n 22. 
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Attachment 1: Workshop Attendance List 
 
Representatives from Burrup negotiations  
Michelle Adams    Yindjibarndi traditional owner 
Trevor Solomon   Ngarluma traditional owner 
Helen Lawrence Principal Legal Officer, Yamatji Marlpa Bana Baba 
Maaja Aboriginal  Corporation and Senior Legal 
Officer during the negotiations 
 
Chris Athanasiou State Lead Negotiator (attended in personal 
capacity) 
Jo-Anne Franz    Office of Native Title (WA) 
Christie Hawker   Office of Native Title (WA) 
 
Representatives from MG-Ord negotiations 
Desmond Hill MG Steering Committee, ASEIA Sub-Committee 
and Steering Committee Ord Enhancement Scheme 
Edna O’Malley MG Steering Committee, Chair of the MG 
Corporation 
Patrick Dodson    MG Lead Negotiator 
Krysti Guest  Senior Legal Officer during the negotiations, 
Kimberley Land Council 
John Roberts     MG Senior Policy Adviser 
 
Chris Athanasiou State Lead Negotiator (attended in personal 
capacity) 
Jo-Anne Franz    Office of Native Title (WA) 
Christie Hawker   Office of Native Title (WA) 
 
Representatives from the Wimmera negotiations 
Jenny Beer    Wimmera traditional owner  
John Caitlin former Director Victorian Native Title Office 
(current Member of the National Native Title 
Tribunal) 
Katie O’Brien    Legal Officer, Native Title Services Victoria 
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Invited Experts 
Roger Cook  former Executive Director of Yamatji Marlpa Bana 
Baba Maaja Aboriginal  Corporation including 
during the Burrup negotiations and former 
Executive Director of South West Land and Sea 
Council during early negotiations  for the 
comprehensive settelement of the Noongar native 
title application 
Professor Marcia Langton Chair Australian Indigenous Studies, University of 
Melbourne and Chief Investigator, Agreements, 
Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Research 
Project 
Bill Lawrie Manager Native Title, South West Land and Sea 
Council, former Manager Native Title 
Ngaanyatjarra Council and former Kimberley 
Regional Manager, National Native Title Tribunal 
Professor Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh School of Politics and Public Policy, Griffith 
University and advisor to number of representatives 
bodies on negotiations with public and private 
interests 
Maureen Tehan Chief Investigator, Agreements, Treaties and 
Negotiated Settlements Research Project and Senior 
Lecturer, Law School, Melbourne Univeristy 
 
Federal Court 
Kristie Dunn    Assistant to Native Title Registrar 
 
National Native Title Tribunal 
Graeme Neate    President 
 
Commonwealth Government 
Iain Anderson    Attorney-General’s Department 
Greg Roche  Department of Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs 
 
State Governments (other than WA) 
Jennifer Jude  NSW Aboriginal and Native Title Unit, Attorney-
General’s Department 
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Marion Moyes   NSW Department of Lands 
Peter Tomkin on behalf of Peter Hall Director Office of Native Title, South Australia 
 
Other NTRB Representatives 
Fiona Campbell   Gurang Land Council 
Kym Elston    North Queensland Land Council 
Philip Vincent    Goldfields Land and Sea Council 
Two representatives from NSW Native Title Services 
 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies  
Toni Bauman     Research Fellow, Native Title Research Unit  
Dr Lisa Strelein   Director, Native Title Research Unit 
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